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Summary
In the global debates on the modes of farming, 
including irrigated farming, that are viable for the 
majority of rural people, three models prevail: 
(i) smallholder family farming; (ii) farming led by 
agribusiness’ capital, technologies, and forward 
and backward linkages in an estate mode; and (iii) 
agribusiness-led farming in an out-grower mode. 
In South Africa, these three and more modes 
of irrigated agriculture have been implemented. 
In the colonial era, in most of the country, the 
state supported a white-dominated estate mode of 
farming based on wage labor. Smallholder family 
farming remained confined to black people in the 
former homelands. Smallholder irrigation schemes 
in the former homelands were out-grower 
schemes, managed by the colluding apartheid 
state, white agribusiness and irrigation industry. 
Since independence in 1994, the search for 
viable modes of farming and irrigation is high on 
the policy agenda. This is part of the envisaged 
transition of the state into a tripartite constellation 
of citizens, state and service providers that 
delivers accountable, outcome-based services. 
Smallholder irrigation schemes in former 
homelands face particular challenges in this 
transition. One of the piloted solutions is a blend 
of the estate and out-grower mode of farming: 
the joint venture. Smallholders pool their plots 
and hand over the land for management by a 
strategic partner from the agribusiness with capital 
for inputs, technologies, and linkages to input 
and output markets. The government ensures the 
construction of irrigation infrastructure. However, 
the results of this option were mixed. 
As a contribution to the search for viable 
modes of smallholder irrigated farming, this report 
analyzes the events and outcomes of smallholder 
irrigation schemes in former homelands where 
joint ventures were piloted. The method used is 
an in-depth historical case study (or ‘biography’) 
applied to the Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme in 
Limpopo Province. Situated on the riparian strips 
along the Olifants River, the overall scheme 
consists of a row of 13 smallholder sub-schemes 
(or ‘farms’) of about 100 hectares (ha) each on 
the right bank and one smallholder sub-scheme 
on the left bank. Six joint ventures have been 
implemented since 2001; three, which had started 
in 2009, had discontinued by 2012.   
The report starts by tracing the early 
dispossession and later resettlement of black 
smallholders under the gendered apartheid 
policies of forced removals, divide and rule 
to break resistance, food security, and white 
agribusiness and irrigation development. In 
these out-grower arrangements, smallholders 
were food secure, but not more than laborers 
on their own fields, while subsidized parastatal 
development corporations managed inputs, 
production, irrigation, storage and sale of the 
produce. 
When the  apar the id  s t ruc tures  were 
dismant led in the new dispensat ion,  the 
irrigation schemes partly or fully collapsed. In 
the Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme, some of the 
smallholders tried to continue irrigating, organize 
loan facilities, and gain access to input and output 
markets. Two tribal authorities leased their land 
to white commercial farmers. In two other sub-
schemes, the cotton industry tried out-grower 
arrangements, but this failed. One joint venture 
was piloted. The new government designed a 
national participatory, inclusive Revitalization 
of Smallholder Irrigation Schemes (RESIS) 
program. However, in Limpopo Province, this 
was brusquely replaced by RESIS Recharge, in 
which a joint venture became the exclusive option. 
This was hailed as progressive, economically 
viable, business-like farming. In the Flag Boshielo 
irrigation scheme, five sub-schemes accepted, all 
with the same strategic partner as the pilot farm; 
the other rejected. 
In the tripartite constellation, the government 
financed the design and installation of a new 
method of high-tech sprinkler systems (‘floppies’), 
as promoted by the continuing irrigation industry. 
The strategic partner contractually committed to 
share half of the net profits with the smallholder 
cooperative, transfer business skills and to 
create employment – in this area with high 
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unemployment rates. Attracted by quick money, 
smallholders organized in cooperatives, pooled 
the land to fit the centralized irrigation and other 
mechanization, and handed it over to the strategic 
partner. They waited as ‘armchair farmers’ until 
the money would come or not. In seasons in 
which the strategic partner announced that there 
were net losses, smallholders’ grievances came 
out most strongly. The main complaint was the 
lack of transparency, especially about the total 
income gained. Moreover, skills were hardly 
transferred and new employment was limited in 
this capital-intensive farming system. The contract 
had no enforcement clauses and gave no power 
to smallholders, neither vis-à-vis the government 
nor vis-à-vis the strategic partner. The latter 
referred the smallholders to the government and 
left with his capital, technologies and market 
connections when conflicts escalated.
Out of the six, three joint ventures continued. 
Two chose another strategic partner. In the 
third, land conflicts among the smallholders, 
and between the smallholders and the state 
temporarily halted production. The other three 
joint ventures broke down in this way. Here, 
smallholders bore the brunt of the costly pilot. 
They had forfeited other production opportunities; 
they had lost production during the years of new 
irrigation infrastructure construction; the fertility of 
their soils was reduced as a result of a quick-win 
production strategy; and vandalism and theft of 
the equipment were rife, aggravated by unclear 
ownership of the pooled land without the former 
individual tenure. 
These experiences immediately led to new 
provincial and national irrigation policies that 
emphasize inclusive, participatory irrigation 
development for all categories of farmers. 
Instead of focusing on irrigation infrastructure 
alone, the wide range of production factors of 
inputs, training and marketing are addressed. 
Joint ventures remain as one of the options, 
on condition that smallholders have a strong 
say in bilateral decision making with a strategic 
partner. The government enables and monitors 
such joint ventures. 
The report concludes with recommendations 
on how to further operationalize these policies. 
For joint ventures, recommendations include a 
robust bilateral contract between the strategic 
partner and smallholders with clear goals and 
enforcement of employment generation, production 
and marketing skills transfer and contacts, risk 
management and internal governance. Support 
to exchange among peers is also recommended. 
Further, smallholders in joint ventures and other 
public smallholder irrigation schemes would 
benefit from stronger land tenure arrangements 
backed by the government. Government support 
is also key to diversify irrigation technologies for 
women and men smallholders. Lastly, further 
comparison of different joint ventures and between 
joint ventures, smallholder schemes, and the 
continuing spontaneous initiatives in the Flag 
Boshielo irrigation scheme and elsewhere, will shed 
more light on viable modes of irrigated farming 
that achieve job creation, food security, poverty 
alleviation and skills development. 
1Joint Ventures in the Flag Boshielo Irrigation Scheme, 
South Africa: A History of Smallholders, States and 
Business
Barbara van Koppen, Barbara Nompumelelo Tapela and  
Everisto Mapedza
Introduction
Rationale
Farm Size and Mode of Farming
For over a century, debates about the relation 
between farm size, mode of farming and land 
productivity have shaped agrarian policies, 
programs and research across the world. Until 
the 2000s, the pendulum tended to swing towards 
small-scale family farming. An inverse relationship 
between farm size and land productivity was 
widely found in Asia (Berry and Cline 1979). 
Millions of smallholder families cultivating 1 
hectare (ha) or less intensified production for 
food and income. Their productivity depended 
on access to production factors, in particular 
fertilizers and irrigation, and access to rewarding 
output markets. Family members had more 
incentives to produce than wage laborers on 
larger farms. Larger farms were only more 
product ive per uni t  of  land when certain 
mechanization, such as tractors, started enabling 
economies of scale. Accordingly, agricultural 
policies in countries such as China and India 
primarily supported smallholders. In China, 
where land distribution became fairly egalitarian, 
this smallholder policy led to massive poverty 
alleviation and broad-based economic growth. 
Anecdotal evidence in sub-Saharan Africa, 
including South Africa, also confirms equal or 
higher land productivity in smaller farms. For 
example, the review of land tenure systems in 
Zimbabwe conducted by Rukuni Commission 
(1994) highlighted the fact that economies of 
scale do not seem to apply in agriculture. In 
the Nwanedzi river sub-catchment in Limpopo 
Province, South Africa, a comparative study of 
land productivity among diverse producers found 
no real difference in land productivity between 
micro-farmers and the large-scale commercial 
mango and cattle producers (Boche and Anjuère 
2015). Again, land productivity depended on skills, 
labor relations, and access to inputs and markets, 
and not on the farm size per se. 
However, since the financial and energy crisis 
of the late 2000s in particular, the pendulum 
of the discourse in agrarian low- and middle-
income countries is swinging towards large-scale 
farming by agribusiness with wage laborers or 
smallholders. This discourse justified the surge 
in foreign and national investors prospecting 
land and, through governments, purchasing large 
tracks of African soils and related water and 
mineral resources, which is also dubbed ‘land 
grabbing’ (Cotula et al. 2009; Hall 2011; Borras 
and Franco 2012; Anseeuw 2015). 
The claimed benefits of agribusiness include 
the following three sets (Hall et al. 2015) – (i) 
agribusiness would bring the indispensable 
financial capital to invest. In this neoliberal 
era, in which the undersourced governments 
lack the capital to invest and kick-start broad-
based agricultural development, the corporate 
sector promised to fill the gap; (ii) agribusiness 
would introduce new technologies and skills 
for mechanization and related economies of 
scale for higher land and labor productivity. The 
promise was that these skills and technologies 
would be transferred to local smallholders; and 
(iii) large-scale agribusiness would open up new 
2backward linkages to national and foreign input 
and agrarian technology providers, and forward 
linkages to global markets. Large volumes of 
produce of standard quality would better satisfy 
demanding consumer markets. This is especially 
the case in Africa’s rural areas, where agricultural 
productivity stagnated while populations kept 
growing alongside strong urbanization, and the 
promises of capital mobilization, technological 
innovation, and new forward and backward 
linkages through large-scale agribusiness were 
appealing. Indeed, this promise that national 
and foreign direct ”...investments in large-scale 
commercial agriculture would result in technology 
transfer – which benefits small farmers, provides 
much-needed food for local markets, creates 
decent employment for the youth, earns foreign 
exchange and forms the basis of industrialization 
– has proven irresistible” (Hall et al. 2015). 
Agribusiness-led farming covers a multitude of 
configurations between agribusiness, government 
and smallholders or local wage laborers or both. 
Bernier and Meinzen-Dick (2015) listed the 
activities in these configurations: authorization, 
planning, financing, irrigation system construction/
replacement, operation and maintenance, on-
farm construction and operation, technical advice, 
production, processing, marketing, and risks and 
benefits assumed.
One distinction in these configurations is 
based on land tenure arrangements. At the one 
end of a continuum is the estate mode, in which 
agribusiness holds the land titles and manages 
the farm, while local people become laborers on 
the land of their ancestors. In South Africa, the 
colonial powers introduced this mode of farming in 
the former white Republic of South Africa (RSA), 
covering 87% of the country’s territory, where it 
relegated Africans to tenants and wage laborers. 
Small-scale agriculture in the remaining 13% of 
former homelands continued primarily to serve 
the reproduction of the labor force (Bundy 1988).
However, in both South Africa and other 
African countries, land appropriation has met 
with strong opposition. In South Africa, land 
redistribution and land restitution became 
important policy goals of the independent 
government after 1994. Elsewhere in Africa, land 
purchase and the estate mode of farming are also 
increasingly contested (Borras and Franco 2012; 
Hall et al. 2015). 
At the other end of the continuum is contract 
farming with smallholder out-growers, who keep 
their land and manage production. Contracts 
with the agribusiness are about input provision, 
extension and purchase of produce. This was 
the mode of farming in the irrigation schemes in 
the homelands during the apartheid era in South 
Africa. In Southern Africa, nowadays, out-grower 
arrangements are common in sugar production, 
in which smallholders have plots in large-scale 
irrigation schemes. Agribusiness can also contract 
dispersed smallholders, which happens in cotton 
or tobacco cultivation. However, for all other crops, 
the policy focus on smallholder agriculture, local 
inputs and market development remains strong. 
In-between the estate and out-grower mode 
is the joint venture. This mode was piloted in 
post-1994 South Africa on large-scale farms 
that were redistributed and restituted to groups 
of smallholders under land reform. In these 
joint ventures, land and labor were provided by 
smallholders, while so-called ‘strategic partners’ 
managed the, often mechanized, cultivation 
process, inputs and marketing. However, these 
joint ventures often discontinued (Hall et al. 2003; 
Lahiff et al. 2012). Joint ventures have also been 
piloted in the smallholder irrigation schemes in 
South Africa’s post-1994 former homelands, and 
are the focus of this report. These joint ventures 
replaced former out-grower arrangements, 
which had collapsed with the dismantling of the 
apartheid structures in the new dispensation. The 
results in the former homelands were also mixed. 
With these experiences and cri t iques, 
the South African government increasingly 
emphasized diversity in smallholder farming styles. 
For example, the Presidency and the Department 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) 
distinguish four typologies, each requiring different 
producer development support: (i) subsistence 
farmers mainly depending on homestead 
gardening; (ii) smallholders in ‘loose’ value 
chains (for example, selling on local markets); 
(iii) smallholders in ‘tight’ value chains (such as 
out-growers in sugar, cotton or barley); and (iv) 
3independent commercial smallholders (Khulisa 
Management Services 2016). 
The policy search for feasible modes of 
farming in different contexts is supported by 
further analysis, and comparison within and 
between the different farm styles on viable, 
sustainable arrangements for all parties involved. 
Irrigation is an important factor in shaping the 
above-mentioned farm modalities, but this has 
so far received limited attention. The research 
presented in this report contributes to these 
debates by providing an in-depth analysis of 
the Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme, Limpopo 
Province, South Africa. Irrigation on the riparian 
strips of the Olifants River, since pre-colonial 
times, evolved into the large black resettlement 
scheme in the former homeland of Lebowa, with 
out-grower arrangements until 1994. Six sub-
schemes (or ‘farms’) became joint ventures from 
2001 onwards. 
Smallholder Irrigation Policy in South Africa
The post-1994 interactions between South African 
smallholders and agribusiness are rooted in a 
long history. The estate mode of large-scale 
commercial farming in the former white RSA 
received a century-long, proactive support by the 
colonial state. Strong support to irrigation resulted 
in 1,550,000 ha of large-scale irrigated land 
(DAFF 2015). 
In the former homelands, the apartheid state 
also initiated irrigation schemes. Currently, some 
300 schemes can irrigate an estimated total of 
50,000 ha, which is 3% of the country’s total 
irrigated area (DAFF 2015). These schemes were 
operated by the government, or a parastatal, and 
smallholder out-growers. The dismantling of the 
apartheid structures in 1994 without immediate 
alternative structures led to the partial or full 
collapse of many of these irrigation schemes. By 
2010, about 206 schemes were still operational, 
but 90 schemes (a third of the total of about 
300) had stopped irrigating (van Averbeke 2011). 
On two-thirds of the schemes that were still 
operational, on average, less than two-thirds 
of the farm area was cultivated (Denison and 
Manona 2007). 
From the 2000s onwards,  the South 
African government started to revitalize the 
ailing smallholder irrigation sector in the former 
homelands, budgeting a total amount of USD 
108,688,0001 over 5 years (2005-2009) (Shaker 
2005; Maepa et al. 2014). Limpopo Province, 
the focus of this report, has the  largest areas 
of former homelands and the country’s highest 
share of smallholder irrigation schemes. Initially, 
the focus was on participatory approaches 
targeted at smallholder families. However, in 
2004, the focus shifted towards joint ventures; 
10 joint ventures were formed in Limpopo 
Province. Smallholders were expected to benefit 
from the same assumed threefold advantages of 
agribusiness. Strategic partners from the large-
scale irrigation sector came forward bringing 
their own capital for inputs (bearing risks), 
sophisticated implements and technological 
skills, and their links to input markets and to 
large-scale farmers’ national and export crop 
production and distribution systems. Smallholders 
and the government were to provide the rest, 
including new irrigation infrastructure. Net profits 
were to be shared between smallholders and the 
strategic partner. 
However, the results of the joint ventures 
were disappointing (Tapela 2009, 2012, 2016a, 
2016b; Denison and Tapela 2009; Nowata 
2014). Less than a decade later, five joint 
ventures had entirely collapsed, land is barren 
and irrigation equipment is vandalized. One 
scheme stopped temporarily because of land 
tenure issues within the community and between 
the community and the government. By 2017, 
the other four schemes continued in somewhat 
different constellations, either being highly 
dependent on government support or ridden 
by conflicts within the community and with the 
strategic partner (Tapela 2009; van Koppen et 
al. 2017) (see Table 1).
1 A conversion rate of USD 1 = ZAR 10 is applied throughout the report.
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failures in both joint ventures and smallholder 
irrigation schemes, and proposed a different 
approach. In 2012, immediately after the formal 
expiry of the first round of joint venture contracts, 
the draft business plan for revitalization of 
irrigation schemes by DAFF2 summarized the 
lessons learned (DAFF 2012). These details were 
confirmed in the national Irrigation Strategy of 
2015 (DAFF 2015). This strategy evaluated joint 
ventures in the broader light of food security, 
poverty alleviation, job creation and skil ls 
development as the outcome-based performance 
framework of the National Development Plan 
2030 (National Planning Commission 2010). 
Accordingly, for any irrigation support, the national 
Irrigation Strategy emphasizes the importance of 
the institutional configuration, and stipulates that 
irrigation interventions must:
•  recognize diversity among smallholders; 
•  plan in a participatory manner with full respect 
for farmers’ preferences; 
•  promote holistic interventions that consider 
all aspects (such as markets, finance, inputs, 
infrastructure, capacity and institution building, 
and crop production information); and 
•  avoid that projects pr imari ly focus on 
infrastructure construction, by allocating two-
thirds of the budget to the soft component 
of human capital development (farmer 
training, institution building, negotiation skills 
development, marketing support, mentoring, 
planning, etc.) and production input costs. 
Further, specifically focusing on joint ventures, the 
Irrigation Strategy states that irrigation projects 
should: 
•  stop encouraging joint ventures with strategic 
partners from the top down, and only accept 
joint ventures for funding if farmers had 
contractually and factually been involved as 
decision makers;
•  ensure that the strategic partner should 
transfer skills; and
•  monitor the joint venture’s contractual 
agreements and mediate in conflict resolution. 
For implementation of this new, diversified 
strategy to revitalize irrigation schemes in former 
homelands, a fourfold increase in the budget 
was proposed in Limpopo Province. Costs went 
up to USD 20,000 per hectare. This is very high 
compared to, for example, the average costs of 
USD 8,233 per hectare for rehabilitation, as found 
in an analysis of 314 irrigation schemes in 50 
African countries (Inocencio et al. 2007; Malik et 
al. 2014). 
The present study seeks to support the cost-
effective implementation of these goals with a 
focus on joint ventures.  
Goal, Questions and Method 
The goal of the present study is to generate 
evidence about the collaborations between 
smallholders, the government, agribusiness 
and irrigation in the historical perspective of 
TABLE 1. Operational status of joint ventures in Limpopo Province in 2015.
Irrigation scheme Number Functioning in 2015
Mariveni (citrus), Phetwane (in Flag Boshielo) 2 Functioning; high government support
Makuleke, Strydkraal (in Flag Boshielo) 2 Functioning; with conflicts
Elandskraal (in Flag Boshielo) 1 Not operational; land tenure conflicts
Tswelopele, Homu, and in Flag Boshielo: Mogalatsane, 5 Not operational after conflicts with strategic 
 Kolekotela and Setlaboswana  partner 
2 The name of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries has slightly changed since 1994. In this report, we use the name in 2017.
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operationalization of the national Irrigation 
Strategy of 2015 towards the creation of viable 
and sustainable joint ventures that contribute 
to goals of smallholder food security, poverty 
alleviation, job creation and skills development. 
Research questions include: 
What were the out-grower arrangements between 
smallholder irrigation, the state and agribusiness 
in former homelands, what was the impact, and 
what changed during and after the transition to 
the new dispensation after 1994? 
How were the joint ventures designed 
to mobilize the three claimed advantages of 
agribusiness: capital mobilization, technology 
and skill transfer, and linking to input and output 
markets? How were they implemented? 
What were smallholders’ individual or 
organized actions and perspectives?    
Why did some joint ventures break down 
whi le  o thers  cont inued? What  were the 
implications for smallholders? 
What lessons can be learned on the future 
cost-effective operationalization of the national 
Irrigation Strategy of 2015?  
Method
The method used to answer these questions is 
the case study approach, or the ‘biography of a 
scheme’, focusing on the Flag Boshielo irrigation 
scheme. The overall scheme consists of a row of 
13 smallholder sub-schemes along the Olifants River 
on the right bank and one on the left bank. It is one 
of the oldest irrigation schemes in the northern half 
of South Africa and has seen a variety of modes of 
farming since pre-colonial times. It includes six of 
the 10 joint ventures in Limpopo Province. 
The research method is largely qualitative 
and historical. The study draws on a range of 
sources. Formal and grey literature, government 
studies and policy documents were reviewed, 
but appeared scarce; it is mostly oral history 
and tradition. From 1999 to 2017, the authors 
visited the scheme at least four times per year 
to interview farmers, local extension workers 
and local managers. In addition, Barbara Tapela 
conducted in-depth studies on Phetwane and 
did a rapid appraisal of selected communities 
in the entire scheme (Tapela 2009). She also 
conducted in-depth follow-up studies in 2016 in 
Phetwane and Elandskraal irrigation schemes 
(Tapela 2016a, 2016b). Everisto Mapedza studied 
Kolekotela, Mogalatsane and Setlaboswana 
irrigation schemes in further detail (Mapedza et 
al. 2016). Barbara van Koppen followed all the 
schemes, in general, and events in Strydkraal, 
in particular; MaTshepo Khumbane, grassroots 
activist, often accompanied her. Strydkraal was 
also studied by Kamara et al. (2002). 
Focused interviews and a cont inuous 
policy dialogue were held with provincial and 
national policy makers and program managers. 
Various national policy dialogues were held 
and research presentations made, including a 
national workshop about joint ventures in 2009 
(Denison and Tapela 2009). 
The Flag Boshielo Irrigation Scheme
The F lag  Bosh ie lo  i r r iga t ion  scheme in 
Sekhukhune District, Limpopo Province, is 
situated some 300 km northeast of Pretoria. 
The Olifants River provides year-round water 
to the left and right bank. In 1987, a large 
multipurpose dam, which releases these flows, 
was finalized. The potential command area is 
well over 2,000 ha. The scheme has a long 
history of changing relationships between the 
government, smallholders and agribusiness. This 
study focuses, in particular, on the row of 13 
black smallholder sub-schemes (or ‘farms’) on 
the right bank, and one farm, Elandskraal, on the 
left bank, each with adjacent residential areas 
(see Figure 1). 
Fo r  th i s  s tudy ,  the  fo l l ow ing  par ts  a re 
distinguished:
Upstream on the left bank: 
Elandskraal, with the first joint venture in 2001, 
which temporarily stopped later (Tapela 2016a). 
6Along the right bank: 
•  The upstream part  of  four farms wi th 
three different chiefs, each with one joint 
venture: Phetwane (which continues) and 
Mogalatsane, Kolekotela, and Setlaboswana 
(which collapsed). 
•  The middle part of seven farms under 
one chief, without joint ventures: Mphane, 
Makgwabe, Malope, Veeplaas (Tonane), 
Phelendaba,  Khuloane and Tswaing. 
However, Veeplaas (Tonane) has leased its 
land to a commercial farmer. 
•  The downstream part of Strydkraal and 
Mooiplaas, under different chiefs, with a 
continuing joint venture in a federation of 
schemes.
FIGURE 1. Irrigable cropland and residential areas of the Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme.
Source: Created by Luxon Nhamo, IWMI.
7Analytical Framework: The Accountability 
Triangle
The national Irrigation Strategy (DAFF 2015) 
reflected the Presidency’s National Development 
P lan  2030,  wh ich  emphas izes  peop le ’s 
participation and government’s outcome-based 
performance to achieve food security, poverty 
alleviation, job creation and skills development 
(National Planning Commission 2010). The 
concept of a developmental state for service 
delivery aligns with the World Bank’s concept 
of public service provision according to the 
‘accountability triangle’ (World Bank 2011). Its 
basic premise is that more accountability to 
service receivers improves the service. This 
triangle maps the three sets of actors and their 
relationships in service delivery (Figure 2). In this 
study, they are: (i) citizens, (ii) the state, and (iii) 
service providers.
Citizens 
In this case, they are class-, age- and gender-
differentiated irrigating smallholders and other 
inhabitants of the Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme, 
within their social context of kinship, tribal and 
other authorities, and other forms of organization 
and leadership. 
The state of politicians and policy makers 
allocating public resources 
In this case, they are, subsequently, the apartheid 
government, which transitioned in the 1990s 
to a democratically elected government under 
presidents Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki and 
Jacob Zuma (RSA 1996).
Service providers are either state staff 
providing services through compacts or 
private service providers contracted by the 
government, or a combination of the two 
In this case, service providers are the pre-1994 
parastatals and pre- and post-1994 government 
staff, and private consultants. The latter included 
the irrigation industry (irrigation equipment 
manufacturers, irrigation design consultancy 
firms, and contractors) and – in the case of joint 
FIGURE 2. Triangle of service delivery, and key relationships of power and accountability.
Source: World Bank 2003.
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8ventures – the strategic partner with his capital, 
inputs, management and market linkages. Service 
providers are upward accountable to the state, 
either as their superiors or contractual clients. 
The mutual relations in this triangle are defined 
as accountable, if: (i) there is a delegation of, 
or request for, an expected service; (ii) there 
are financial or other rewards for delivering that 
service; (iii) the service is actually delivered; and 
(iv) the ability exists to enforce the expectation, 
which supposes that (v) there is sufficient 
information about the service performance (World 
Bank 2011). 
World Bank (2011) distinguished a long and 
a short route towards accountability, and hence 
better services. The base of the triangle in Figure 
2 is the short route and the two top sides of the 
triangle represent the long route to accountability. 
Although it is underlined that there is no blueprint 
or panacea, experience across the world suggests 
that a combination of both routes is most effective.
The short route to accountability is directly 
between service providers and citizens. In this 
relationship, citizens’ voice is manifest as client 
power. Client payments for services or other 
contributions hold service providers accountable. 
Choice among various service providers and co-
production of services in participatory planning 
also strengthen clients’ power. 
The long route to accountability has two legs. 
First, citizens hold their politicians accountable in 
multi-party states such as South Africa primarily 
by elections at local, regional and national levels, 
and also by lobbying, protests and other forms 
of civil action. In this way, citizens delegate an 
expectation of service delivery, for which many 
pay taxes. Second, politicians liaise with the 
policy makers who allocate public resources 
that shape the services, and delegate the actual 
service delivery to government service providers 
(compacts) and private firms (contract). 
This triangle allows unravelling of the relations 
and actions, and explains different outcomes 
between the government, the irrigation industry 
and the strategic partner, and their mutual 
accountabilities. 
Report Structure
The report structure is chronological. In the next 
section, we discuss the pre-1994 history of the 
then ‘Olifants-Sekhukhune irrigation scheme’ of 
farmers’ settlement and intervention by parastatals 
or the apartheid government. The section 
Collapse and Responses analyzes events during 
the 1990s when the government changed, and 
explains the collapse of the irrigation scheme and 
responses by women and men irrigators, other 
inhabitants, private consultants, the agribusiness 
(including informal lease arrangements between 
chiefs and private large-scale farmers) and 
the new government. While the government 
started with a participatory Revitalization of 
Smallholder Irrigation Schemes (RESIS), this 
became ‘RESIS Recharge’ with an exclusive focus 
on joint ventures. The section Implementation of 
RESIS Recharge’ analyzes the implementation 
of RESIS Recharge, and identifies how and 
why some schemes broke down while others 
continued to irrigate and produce. Responses by 
those who suffered losses and other inhabitants 
of the scheme are also discussed. The report 
ends with lessons and recommendations for 
the government on how to enable and monitor 
a strong, short route to accountability between 
smallholders and the agribusiness, and how to 
support smallholders in the second leg of the long 
route to accountability on land tenure and water 
infrastructure, in order to achieve food security, 
poverty alleviation and employment generation 
in South Africa. The recommendations may, 
potentially, be applied elsewhere. 
9Land Appropriation and Resettlement 
This prime riparian land along the Olifants River 
has been one of the earliest ‘land and water 
grabs’ by the Afrikaner Boers, who had left the 
Cape area in search of more land and access to 
sea harbors for trade through the northern part of 
South Africa. Before their arrival in the mid-1800s, 
the strip was occupied and farmed by the Pedi. 
The Boers gradually dispossessed the land and 
the British followed. As elsewhere in the colony, 
the settlers demarcated large farms and declared 
these lands under the British title deed system 
as their own, which was mainly for speculation 
purposes initially (Lahiff 1999). This ‘lawful’ 
encroachment was enforced by the British imperial 
army, in particular by defeating paramount chief 
Sekhukhune in 1879 (Delius 1984). 
The ‘farm’ blocks date back to that era: surveyors 
carved out 14 blocks of land of an area between 
50 and 250 ha (called ‘farms’). Between 1871 and 
1973, individuals with both Afrikaner and English 
names obtained title deeds. Through sale, inheritance 
and bankruptcy, all farms changed hands at least 
once and some as often as five times. Twelve out 
of 14 farms were transferred to mineral speculation 
companies. These companies separated the mineral 
rights, which they retained for themselves. The 
surface rights were further transferred. By the 1930s, 
all land (minus the mineral rights) was in private 
hands. Over time, the Pedi inhabitants of the area 
were subjugated as tenants or farm laborers on their 
ancestors’ land (Lahiff 1999). 
The t i t le deeds also mentioned water 
levies for irrigation, which were paid to the 
Middelburg Irrigation Board. The latter was one 
of the first white Irrigation Boards. By declaring 
that this part of the Olifants River had to be 
regulated by the 1926 Water Court normal flow 
apportionment, the white settlers also ‘lawfully’ 
exerted their self-declared rights to the passing 
waters, dispossessing the Pedi from their prior 
customary water rights as well (Lahiff 1999). A 
river abstraction weir, abstraction pump house and 
earth canals were constructed in 1933.
The Pedi were then resettled on the farms. In 
1936, the Native Trust and Land Act was passed. 
This made provision for the purchase of land in 
order to extend the so-called Native Reserves. 
The right bank of the Olifants River was slated 
for that purpose. The South African Native 
(later: Development) Trust bought many of the 
above-mentioned farms between 1938 and 1963. 
They settled Africans and formalized irrigation 
in line with the ‘Irrigation’ chapter (chapter 29) 
in the Tomlinson Report3, which referred to: 
“vibrant irrigation by black people. Some had 
taken up irrigation on their own initiative and 
explicitly requested further irrigation support.” 
The Tomlinson Report also highlighted how Pedi 
farmers in the nearby Nebo District had voluntarily 
contributed labor to construct 60 earthen dams in 
collaboration with the agricultural section of the 
Native Department, and 11,300 bags of wheat 
were produced (Houghton 1956). In the policy of 
the Tomlinson Report, the northeastern regions 
of the Transvaal Province (currently Limpopo 
and Mpumalanga provinces) were to get most of 
the 122 irrigation schemes in the Union of South 
Africa. Within this region, the Olifants River was 
particularly important: 36 schemes were along 
the Olifants River. After the apartheid regime 
had come to power in 1948, it promulgated the 
Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, the Promotion of 
Bantu Self-government Act of 1959, and Lebowa’s 
declaration of internal self-government in 1972. 
The latter consolidated the appointment of a 
Lebowa government consisting of chiefs reporting 
to, and implementing orders and investments 
from, ‘Pretoria’, the capital of the country. 
Initially, the resettlement of black farmers 
on the purchased Trust Land along the Olifants 
River met resistance. The Tomlinson Report 
noted that, initially, “the local population was very 
Pre-1994: The Olifants/Sekhukhune Irrigation Scheme
3 After its election in 1948, the apartheid government appointed a commission, chaired by Tomlinson, to study the economic viability of the 
'reserves' (later homelands) and the required investments. Hardly any of the other proposed actions have been implemented.
10
unwilling to take up irrigation.” However, by 1952, 
“472 plots had been allocated.” Other farms were 
purchased later. A “maintenance rent” of 1.10 
pounds per year was charged (Houghton 1956). 
Each household obtained a plot of usually 1.28 
ha (1.5 morgen) plus a house ‘with the same 
number’ as the plot in the new settlements. After 
1969, all plots of the Pedi were classified as 
state land, held on the basis of a Permission to 
Occupy (PTO) according to the Bantu Areas Land 
Regulations (Proclamation R188 of 1969). This 
drew its legal authority from the 1936 Native Trust 
and Land Act (Lahiff 1999) (See Annex for the 
pre-1994 policies and laws). 
This settlement and irrigation development 
in the Olifants-Sekhukhune scheme served 
various political and food security goals of the 
apartheid government, including the following: 
consolidating the territorial segregation because 
the above-mentioned purchase of Trust Land 
rendered this stretch of the river as the boundary 
between Lebowa and the white RSA; pacifying 
forcefully removed chiefs and their followers 
by ‘compensating’ them with irrigated land; 
favoring many different smaller allied chiefs 
to break organized resistance, especially by 
Chief Sekhukhune and his followers, who were 
a stronghold of the upcoming African National 
Congress; pacifying male plot holders by giving 
them all resource rights and more power over 
their wives; pacifying all settlers in the scheme 
through food security (by the late 1980s, only 
30% of the food consumed in the homelands was 
produced internally; the large majority of black 
people already depended on the purchase of food 
produced by white farmers); providing employment 
to white irrigation engineers and managers; and in 
the course of the years, ensuring full white control 
over mechanized technology, including irrigation 
infrastructure. There has never been any ambition 
to initiate ‘economically viable’ irrigation. The 
settlement on the farms at the right bank, from 
upstream to downstream, reflects these goals as 
follows. 
The extent of forced removals to enforce 
territorial segregation, of contested land claims, 
scattered chieftaincies, and the resulting lack 
of effective farmers’ organization up to this 
day, is reflected in the settlement history. The 
two most upstream farms – Hindoestan (later 
Phetwane) and Coetzeesdraai (later Mogalatsane) 
– were allocated to Frank Sikoane Matlala 
Maseremule. This chief, together with his followers 
from the Ba-Kone tribe, was first removed from 
Pietersburg, and settled in and around Jane Furse 
(in Sekhukhune land). He had no strong bonds 
with Chief Sekhukhune and was one of the first 
chiefs to accept Pretoria’s offer of a position in the 
newly declared Lebowa homeland government. 
His son Mokgome M. Matlala became minister 
in the homeland department of home affairs, 
instilling strong tribal-based authority, which 
continues up to this day. These chiefs allocated 
the plots of the two farms in perpetuity to men. 
After 1994, a land claim for this farm was lodged 
by a community that resided in Leeuwfontein 
(near Marble Hall). Their grandparents were called 
‘petwane’. According to the claim, they had lost 
this land in 1958 for “reasons of ethnicity” to the 
people of Matlala (Lahiff 1999; Claassens 2001; 
Tapela 2009). 
In 1962, the farm Krokodilheuvel (later 
Kolekotela) was occupied by members of the 
Mampana community. They previously lived on 
white farms scattered in Sekhukhune and were 
brought together on this farm (Lahiff 1999). 
The next eight downstream farms, from 
Struisvogelkoppie (later Setlaboswana) to 
Haakdoringsdraai (Tswaing), are followers of Chief 
Masemola, the original resident chief in this area 
who reported to paramount Chief Sekhukhune. 
The eight Masemola farms are Struisvogelkoppie 
(later Setlaboswana; the only farm that became a 
joint venture later), Gaataan (Mphane), De Paarl 
(Makgwabe), Nooitgezien (Malope), Veeplaas 
(Tonane), Wonderboom (Phelendaba), Vlakplaas 
(Khuloane) and Haakdoorndraai (Tswaing). 
Family members had also been scattered on 
various white farms, but they were eventually 
consolidated. The central area, Veeplaas (‘place 
of cattle’, and later Tonane), only got irrigation 
infrastructure in 1983.
The  two  fa rms  fu r thes t  downs t ream 
experienced the most troubling relocation of 
Chief Masha and his followers to Strydkraal, 
while prior inhabitants used the farm Mooiplaas. 
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In the 1950s, Chief Masha and his followers 
were forcefully removed from Kalkfontein, near 
Lydenburgh in current Mpumalanga. Pretoria 
gave Chief Masha and some of his followers 
these farms as a form of economic and moral 
compensation. Chief Masha obtained a relatively 
important position in the Lebowa government. He 
interacted actively with the Lebowa Department 
of Agriculture and white engineering firms, which 
gave him the reputation of an entrepreneurial 
and progressive chief. In 1987, the government 
gave a center pivot to ‘the community’ (a center 
pivot is a method of circle irrigation, in which 
equipment with sprinklers rotates around a pivot). 
However, as a community member narrated 
in an interview, “it appeared difficult for the 
community to manage, so Chief Masha took the 
management over.” The chief, at his turn, leased 
the operation out to the first strategic partner in 
the Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme. This was a 
white farmer (Farmer B) from Marble Hall, which 
is the nearest white town situated some 40 km 
away. There was a direct contract between 
the two, which was to last up to 2007. Other 
community members in Strydkraal did not like 
Farmer B. As one mentioned in an interview, “He 
was shooting at our animals even if they were 
far, and without warning.” 
However, the Nchabeleng and Ga-Nkoane 
communities of Apel further downstream lived 
in the same area and cultivated the farm of 
Mooiplaas. They felt that Chief Masha and 
his people were forced upon them without 
consultation, and deprived them of part of their 
land in the irrigation scheme. This compounded 
increasing political contest between Nchabelengs’ 
ant i -apartheid movement and the Masha 
community. The struggle became violent and led 
to the abandonment of most of the Mooiplaas 
scheme.
Lastly, the most recent removals concerned 
the people settling on the Trust farm Elandskraal. 
Th is  fa rm is  on the le f t  bank,  oppos i te 
Mogalatsane (see Figure 1). These inhabitants 
were settled in the 1980s after removal from 
Moutse in the former Kwa’Ndbele homeland 
(Tapela 2009). 
Centralizing Water Infrastructure and 
Managerial Control
Government control over water for irrigated 
production and white irrigation professionals’ 
state and parastatal employment and expertise 
increased. As elsewhere in South Africa’s 
homeland irrigation, the water infrastructure 
was mostly flood irrigation until the 1970s. Also 
triggered by floods in the 1950s, the apartheid 
government started improving the water provision. 
In the 1960s, it finished the construction of the 
– still existing today – concrete canals, and the 
Makotswane, Lepellane, Nkadimene and Piet 
Gouws dams. The latter was also used to provide 
water for domestic use in Chief Masemola’s 
village. Further, in the upstream farms, pumps 
were installed to lift water out of the river. In the 
middle of the scheme, near Veeplaas, a weir was 
constructed in the Olifants River to feed a gravity 
canal that conveys water to the fields of the 
downstream farms, which also still happens today. 
Water allocation became better controlled 
as well. After the 1956 Water Act, the riparian 
stretches along the entire Olifants River became 
Government Water Control Areas. New Irrigation 
Districts were formed to control water abstraction. 
The most upstream stretch, including both farms 
of Chief Matlala, and farms on the left bank 
became part of the Olifants Irrigation District 
(proclaimed in 1968). Farms further downstream 
along the right bank of the Olifants River became 
the Sekhukhuneland Irrigation District, proclaimed 
in 1969. Interestingly, in 1980, an agreement 
about the water apportionment was arranged 
between the ‘co-basin states’ of the white RSA 
and the entire self-governing homeland of 
Lebowa. Acknowledging Lebowa’s ‘rightful claim 
to the water’ of the river that crossed their area, 
a proportion of precisely 52.65% of water was 
allocated during critical months. However, since 
the allocation was a share, it was added that, 
because of water variability in the large upstream 
Loskop Dam, “the allocation to Lebowa and the 
other consumers downstream of the Loskop Dam 
also had to be determined from season to season’ 
(Department of Water Affairs 1991a). 
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Again, in line with irrigation developments 
elsewhere in the country from 1980 onwards (van 
Averbeke et al. 2011), the apartheid government 
in Pretoria subsidized white development 
corporations and the white engineering firms 
to step up their efforts in the homelands in a 
next round of investments. They upgraded the 
schemes to more expensive, energy consuming 
and more centralized technologies. These were 
“excessively capital intensive, based on the most 
sophisticated modern technologies” (Laker 2004). 
There was a reason for this:
“Since consultants always received a 
fee based on a percentage of the capital 
expenditure, it was to their advantage to 
plan the most capital expensive system. 
The South African government funded 
only capital expenditures and not running 
costs and it was thus easy to convince 
homeland governments to go for capital 
intensive projects, rather than those with 
higher running costs, e.g., labour intensive 
ones” (Laker 2004). 
This was the start of the trend in which 
“design solutions appear to have been scaled 
down versions of first world technology rather 
than finding a solution that would work well for 
smallholder farmers” (Machethe et al. 2004). 
As an extension worker remembered, with 
great zeal and efficiency, technologies were 
developed in the Olifants scheme. Within just 
3 years, new equipment and electricity were 
installed by 1983. Pumping from the canals or 
river gave pressure to piped side-roll sprinklers 
and center pivots (which required centralized 
cont ro l ) .  These upgrades a lso  inc luded 
the central grazing area of the Masemola 
community, Veeplaas, implicitly seeking to 
pacify Chief Sekhukhune as well. The Veeplaas 
farm became a sprinkler irrigation scheme 
with 28 plots of 2.5 ha (out of which five were 
allocated to women) and two plots of 10 ha 
(allocated to relatives of Chief Masemola) 
(Lahiff 1999). Thus, the total area on the right 
bank from upstream Hindustan (Phetwane) to 
downstream Mooiplaas became 1,873 ha. Piped 
sprinkler covered 71% of the irrigated area, 
center pivot covered 10% and 19% was under 
flood irrigation (Small and Stimie 1999). 
In  1987,  the Government  o f  Lebowa 
completed the construction of a large dam just 
upstream of Phetwane and Elandskraal. This was 
called the Arabie Dam4. The name of the irrigation 
scheme also changed to Arabie scheme. A short-
term purpose of the scheme was to provide water 
for domestic use for communities downstream 
and also for irrigation. Further, the available 
surface water from the Arabie Dam for irrigation 
was set at 2,767 ha. However, the medium-
term consideration was to provide municipal 
water to the province’s capital of Polokwane 100 
km away; as well as water provision to mines 
further downstream in Limpopo and Mpumalanga 
provinces and in the adjacent North-West 
Province in the western direction (Department of 
Water Affairs 1991b). Moreover, the dam allowed 
for better regulated downstream dry-season flows 
and flood mitigation (nevertheless, severe floods 
in the 2000s still caused major damage to the 
irrigation schemes). The new dam inundated 
1,288 ha. An estimated 200 people have been 
displaced without compensation. Some of them 
raised this issue and lodged a land claim in 2012, 
when the plans for nature conservation for tourism 
were discussed (Tapela 2009).
State-subsidized Out-grower 
Arrangements
The management of input provision, marketing 
facilities and water technologies such as pumps 
and sprinklers was centralized. This was provided 
either by irrigation engineers contracted by 
the government as parastatals or employed as 
government staff. Between 1983 and 1988, the 
greater part of the scheme was managed by 
the Agriculture Management Services (AMS) on 
behalf of the Lebowa government. The remainder 
4 While some authors (e.g., Department of Water Affairs 1991b) refer to this dam as the Mokgoma Matlala (M.M. Matlala) Dam, others give 
that name to the Piet Gouws Dam. 
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was managed by the Lebowa Department of 
Agriculture and Environmental Conservation itself. 
From 1989 to 1992, another company already in 
existence, the Lebowa Agricultural Corporation 
(LAC), took over from AMS. In 1996, with the 
consolidation of the nine new provinces in the 
new South Africa that had gained independence 
in 1994, the greater part of the scheme came 
under the management of the Agricultural and 
Rural Development Corporation (ARDC). This was 
a merger of various development corporations in 
three former homelands in the north (Matlala and 
Shaker 2003). ARDC, receiving USD 7 million per 
year from the treasury, employed a staff of 1,200 
and had a salary bill alone of USD 2.2 million. It 
cultivated and provided services for 120,000 ha 
of government land (Shah et al. 2002). Service 
costs were paid by government subsidies and by 
service charges to farmers. 
In 1993, the ownership of the irrigated plots 
was transferred from the South Africa Native 
Trust to the Government of Lebowa, with the 
exception of two schemes that were bought 
by the Masemola Tribe and two farms that 
remained with the South African Development 
Trust (Lahiff 1999). 
The centralized managers were white and 
they employed black staff. The Arabie scheme 
had five extension workers. One of them recalled 
in the interview: “I was always there as the black 
man with the white man, to mediate and explain. 
For example, black cultivators were numbers. 
Sometimes people who had worked hard and had 
harvested well, got less income. I was then the 
one to check, so I found out that the numbers had 
been mixed up.”  
The central management dictated from the top 
down: the crop to be sown, which was alternately 
wheat and maize, sometimes cotton, but hardly 
ever high-value vegetables, although farmers were 
quite interested (Maloa and Nkosi 1993); dates 
of ploughing and other operations; provision of 
paid mechanized ploughing services; fertilizers 
and chemicals to be used; day and hours when 
the sprinkler pipes had to be moved; days for 
harvesting and central collection of the produce; 
and payment days. The management insisted on 
collecting all produce and discouraged any local 
trade (though it still occurred). They brought the 
harvest to the Oos Transvaal Kooperasie – East 
Transvaal Cooperative (OTK) or Nord Transvaal 
Kooperasie – North Transvaal Cooperative (NTK), 
which calculated the income. Costs for cultivation 
were subtracted from the total income gained to 
pay the net incomes. Indeed, farmers were no 
more than laborers on their own plots, bearing 
the risks of this high-input, expensive and high-
risk form of farming (Shah et al. 2002). A farmer 
compared his situation before with the later 
dependency on central AMS managers and high 
production costs to be paid at harvest: “Though 
we produced little before they came, we owed 
nobody” (Maloa and Nkosi 1993). 
Gendered Divide and Rule 
Apartheid policies of territorial segregation 
and ultra-exploited migrant labor were strongly 
gendered. Irrigation policies added an ironic twist. 
By the 1960s, the Pedi agrarian economy was 
specialized along gender lines, which created 
mutual dependency (Monnich 1967). Few activities 
such as gathering were carried out by everybody. 
Warfare, hunting, cattle, sheep and goats (but not 
pigs and fowls) were men’s domain. It included 
the herding, milking, slaughtering and washing of 
milking utensils. It was often a taboo for women to 
engage in this domain. Men were also responsible 
for keeping the cattle out of the crop fields. 
Women, on the other hand, were responsible 
for domestic chores, including fetching of water for 
domestic use and wood. Other water-dependent 
activities, such as brewing of beer and cleaning 
and repairing huts and courtyards, were also 
women’s domain. Men were responsible for 
building and thatching of houses, while women 
made the floors, walls and the decorations. 
Pottery was often a woman’s task. Gender 
pat terns for  reeds work var ied.  Men did 
woodwork, and work in hides and leather. 
Crop cultivation was women’s domain, with 
the use of the iron hoe. Women decided on the 
cultivation of crops such as sorghum, millets, 
pumpkins, watermelons, calabashes, beans, 
yams and types of tobacco. There was no taboo 
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for men to participate in cultivation. Men shared 
responsibility in land clearing, in particular. Girls 
assisted their mothers, and both boys and girls 
assisted in bird scaring. This was a burdensome 
task for sorghum and millet, but was not needed 
for maize. The cultivation of vegetable gardens 
could be carried out by men or women or both. 
Rights over land were with the husband’s kin. 
The mother-in-law allocated land to their sons’ 
wives. The importance of the mother-in-law 
is illustrated by the name of the ‘moon which 
bursts’, coinciding with October’s spring time. 
This moon was called “the strict mother-in-law,” 
who kept her daughters-in-law occupied with 
agricultural activities from the ploughing season 
until the end of the harvest. Sizes of farms 
depended mostly upon the capability to cultivate. 
Among the Pedi, this was 2 to 6 acres (0.81 to 
2.43 ha) (Monnich 1967). 
The apartheid government distorted this 
gendered mode of production and separated families 
to serve the white minority economy. Under the 
notorious betterment programs in the homelands, 
men’s livestock was massively culled (Bundy 
1988). This contributed to men’s labor migration at 
extremely low individual wages and their living in 
harsh temporary hostels. Women’s crop production 
became the unpaid mainstay for the reproduction of 
the labor force: raising children, and taking care of 
the sick and returning pensioners.  
Paradoxical ly,  the apartheid irr igat ion 
developers introduced the European notion of 
the nuclear family, solely engaged in irrigated 
farming, with the male household head as 
the ‘natural’, sole household member entitled 
to land, technologies and other productive 
resources, including the fruits of their wives’ 
labor .  Thus,  the Toml inson Commiss ion 
recommended a size of 1 or 1.5 morgen (1.28 
ha) because: 
“Out of the various farming and settlement 
systems, irrigated farming is undoubtedly 
the enterprise for which the Bantu has 
proven that they are able, under white 
management and leadership, to make an 
economic living out of full-time farming 
and to use the land economically for food 
production. Unlike rainfed agriculture, the 
man does not avoid activities here – the 
man and his whole family are active on 
the plots” (Houghton 1956). 
The Tomlinson Commission explained that a 
size of 1.5 morgen would allow a nuclear family 
to cultivate full time. As studies from the Olifants 
River scheme had shown, a gross income of 
110 pounds could be derived from 1.5 morgen 
(1.28 ha). This was seen as enough income 
for a reasonable livelihood – according to white 
perceptions of Bantu standards of ‘viability’. While 
these 1.28 ha plots were allocated to men as 
‘heads of households’, only smaller gardens of 
one sixteenth of the size of irrigation plots were to 
be given to ‘widows’ (Houghton 1956).
The Commission also gave strict instructions 
stating that all those who got plots should give up 
other farming and work full time on the irrigation 
plots. Plot holders were not allowed to leave their 
homes for more than 14 days without written 
permission from the (white) scheme manager. 
Also, no other families were allowed in the 
dwellings of the irrigating households without 
permission from the manager (Houghton 1956). 
These new relat ive privi leges for men 
over their wives served a further goal, as also 
echoed in magazines such as the ‘Bantu’. 
Commenting on how native men often went 
for migrant labor, while women continued 
cultivation, they stated that irrigation was the 
best way to raise men’s interest in cultivation, 
so that they would stop migrating (The Bantu 
1970). Thus, men were co-opted to join elite 
irrigation at the expense of women by further 
reinforcing men’s resource rights and powers 
over the labor of their wives. Thus, in the 
same way in which irrigation technologies 
became ‘scaled down versions of first world 
technologies’ (Machethe et al. 2004), the white 
managers continued the divide and rule by 
scaling down white family norms with men as 
household heads solely entitled to new irrigation 
land and other resources and new powers over 
the fruits of the labor of their female kin. 
In reality, the ‘widows’ supposed to receive at 
best one sixteenth of men’s plots may well have 
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included married women. Even stronger, by 1994, 
the majority of irrigating cultivators in the Olifants 
River scheme and all other government-supported 
smallholder irrigation schemes in the Olifants 
Basin were – and still are – women. Percentages 
vary from 70 to 90% or more (Van Koppen 2002). 
In the Olifants irrigation scheme, between 20 and 
40% of the official PTOs were even in women’s 
names by 1999, although the law prescribed 
that only men could obtain PTOs. This reflected 
women’s continued role in cultivation and their 
land inheritance after the death of their husbands. 
In Veeplaas, the proportion of women was 40%. 
Their (female) Chief Masemola explained in an 
interview how conflicts tend to arise when men 
claim part of the harvest on the basis of land 
claims without contributing to the work. Her late 
father considered that unfair. Moreover, women 
came to cash the cheques from the marketing 
cooperatives. It was often confusing when 
cheques in their husbands’ names were cashed 
(van Koppen and de Lange 1999). Expectedly, 
in the Pedi culture, women were generally more 
productive than men, and even more if they held 
the plot in their names. This is what Kamara et 
al. (2002) found in the mid and late 1990s, the 
last cropping seasons before the apartheid state 
structures were dismantled. 
Food Security and Local Water 
Development
Last but not least, irr igation brought food 
security. By the early 1990s, women and 
men plot holders in the irrigated farms of the 
Arabie/Olifants River irrigation scheme were 
generally content with food for household 
consumption, especially maize, and for income 
from surplus sales of wheat or sometimes 
cotton. Strictly organized and appreciating the 
benefits, they effectively arranged communal 
works such as canal maintenance or the 
moving of the sprinkler pipes when the big 
be l l  was rung.  However ,  these sat is f ied 
sub jec ts  o f  sa t is f ied  ch ie fs  were  a  t iny 
minority of the Lebowa homeland. 
Although the irrigation canals were designed 
for irrigation only, they served many other 
purposes as well, also for the growing number 
of inhabitants without plots. People used the 
water in the canals, dams, river and wetlands 
for  cropping,  hort icul ture,  domest ic  use, 
livestock, fisheries, brick making and other uses. 
The few boreholes installed by the government 
in some residential areas were often insufficient 
to meet even domestic needs. Homestead 
wells and boreholes also served l ivestock 
and gardening. Irrigated gardens were set up, 
both formally by the government and various 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and 
informally by women’s groups and individuals 
tapping water from the canals or river. The 
small communal garden plots were mainly or 
exclusively in women’s names. For example, 
the gardens set up by the Rural Women’s 
Association in Apel served some 300 women 
on 30 ha (Pardeller et al. 1999). With expanding 
populations and the collapse of most irrigation 
activities, these informal water uses increased. 
In sum, the three sets of actors in the 
accountability triangle collaborated. Irrigators 
in the Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme were a 
relatively privileged minority compared to the 
rapidly expanding number of other inhabitants 
of the area. They produced and were food 
secure. However, men and certainly women 
smallholders were no more than laborers on 
their state-owned plots. They had hardly any 
power vis-à-vis the apartheid government 
and the parastatal or government service 
providers that gained employment. The latter 
controlled all cultivation from the top down and 
with increasingly mechanized technologies: 
access to inputs, water and markets. The state 
achieved its goals of territorial segregation by 
compensating forcefully removed chiefs with 
some political prestige, and their male followers 
with land rights at the expense of their female 
kin and prior inhabitants.   
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Collapse and Responses 
1990s: Collapse 
The dismantling of the apartheid state exposed 
smallholder irrigators’ strong dependency on that 
government with far-reaching consequences. 
Already from 1989 onwards, the apartheid 
government’s investments to finance the white-
dominated irrigation management agencies 
began to dwindle. Government budgets reduced 
by more than 40% (Maloa and Nkosi 1993). By 
1993, the incoming government started to see 
the (white) publicly funded agencies as expensive 
and inefficient (Maloa and Nkosi 1993). Once the 
new African National Congress (ANC) government 
came to power, the political will to keep funding 
these ‘apartheid structures’ was even less. The 
new government decided to drastically reduce 
the funding of the ARDC, from USD 7 to 2 million 
(Matlala and Shaker 2003). 
Hence, from the winter wheat crop of 1996 
onwards, farmers had to take over all production 
costs, starting with the payment of electricity 
bills. However, capital for the purchase of inputs 
was lacking, and it appeared impossible for 
the isolated farmers to organize in groups to 
arrange such collective action from scratch. Some 
traditional leaders tried to keep filling that void, 
but with less support from the ANC government 
than from the apartheid government. Still awaiting 
the demarcation of local government boundaries 
by 2000, the interim Transitional Local Councils 
hardly had any power. Moreover, tribal authorities 
contested these entirely new local government 
structures. The division of the entire irrigation 
scheme over four new municipalities was yet 
another obstacle to scheme-wide organization5. 
A downward spiral kicked in. Pumps broke 
down and were not repaired. Canals were not 
cleared anymore. Lack of income from one crop 
prohibited the purchase of the costly inputs for the 
next crop. By 1999, only 30% of the scheme was 
cultivated (Small and Stimie 1999). The bad news 
on the ground was accompanied by a strong 
recourse to a neoliberal discourse of ‘standing on 
one’s own feet’ and own payment for all inputs, 
which would soon include water. One farmer 
commented: “It is okay for us to stand on our own 
feet, but this has been too sudden.” 
Various responses emerged side by side. 
As elaborated below, some plot holders, 
especially women, continued irrigated cultivation. 
Other inhabitants expanded informal irrigation. 
Agribusiness arranged private deals with tribal 
authorities and also engaged with some farmers. 
All others immediately lost out, and the most 
marginalized, especially elder women plot holders, 
lost the most. 
Responses by Plot Holders and 
Inhabitants
Where possible, plot holders tried hard to take 
irrigated cultivation forward on their own. This 
happened mainly with the non-mechanized gravity 
irrigation. In the Phelendaba (Wonderboom) farm, 
for example, interviewers learned that individual 
farmers or small groups, mainly women but often 
led by men, tried their best to establish direct 
relationships with the Land Bank for loans (but 
they were too small to be considered) and direct 
contacts with the cooperatives for sale (which 
failed). 
Along the canals, women, in particular, started 
or continued informal gardens, whether the 
existing or self-made offtakes were seen as illegal 
or not. Saving groups also emerged, especially 
among food plot holders with small farm sizes of 
0.12 ha (Machethe et al. 2004). 
Some younger men tried to form a union, 
defending the resource rights of their illiterate 
mothers and fathers. However, they were ignored. 
The National African Farmers’ Union failed to 
engage. There was some discussion about the 
5 The boundaries of the new municipalities largely follow those of the chieftaincies. Elandskraal and Phetwane are in Greater Marble Hall/Elias 
Motsoaledi municipality; Mogalatsane farm is in Ephraim Mogale; the farms from Kolekotela to Tswaing in Makhudu Thamaga, and Strydkraal 
and Mooiplaas in Fetakgomo local municipality. They all fall within the Greater Sekhukhune District Municipality.
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option of transferring ownership of both land 
and irrigation equipment, for example, initiated 
by the two larger farmers in the Veeplaas farm 
and some other farmers. Community Property 
Associations could have been formed to that end. 
This was the institutional form that was proposed 
for land reform elsewhere in South Africa. These 
associations could have been aligned to the 
formation of multi-tier Water User Associations 
(WUAs). However, this option was not pursued 
further, partly because of the risk that chiefs 
would dominate the process (van Koppen and de 
Lange 1999). 
The only continuity was in Strydkraal, where 
Chief Masha and Farmer B continued operating 
the center pivot and cultivating cotton.
Agribusiness: Cotton out-grower 
Schemes
Agr ibus iness  s tepped in .  In  two fa rms, 
agribusiness attempted cotton out-grower 
arrangements with all plot holders: in the 
Veeplaas and Phetwane farms. Both efforts 
failed. Highly mechanized cotton cultivation is 
high risk: inputs are costly, so profitability mainly 
depends on very high production. Any glitch in the 
production process would lead to net losses (Shah 
et al. 2002; Tapela 2009). 
The f i rst  in i t iat ive was undertaken by 
LONRHO in Veeplaas in 1998 and 1999. 
However, interviewees complained about logistic 
delays in the provision of inputs and fertilizers, 
which rendered the production for most farmers, 
except the most diligent ones, too low to accrue 
any net benefits. As risks bearers, farmers wanted 
to return to the cultivation of maize for their food 
security. LONRHO left, also because of low 
profitability and internal strategic changes.  
While the central buildings in Veeplaas were 
taken over from the ARDC by members of the 
Masemola chieftaincy, the land and the irrigation 
equipment remained idle. Farmer B, who already 
operated the center pivot with Chief Masha in 
Strydkraal, stepped into that void. He asked Chief 
Masemola to lease the land to him. Without much 
transparency within the tribal council, she agreed. 
Plot holders were said to have received some 
USD 20-30 per plot as rent, a very low value 
for this prime land and free infrastructure (from 
interviews with an extension worker). Since then, 
Farmer B has been cultivating various crops. The 
Provincial Department of Agriculture protested 
against these private arrangements about state 
land and equipment, and started a court case 
against Farmer B which was never concluded 
(interview with provincial official).
The other case was in Phetwane and 
supported by the Limpopo Department of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (LDARD)6: 
cotton growing with the Nordelike Sentrale Katoen 
(NSK) (North Central Cotton). The LDARD 
rehabilitated the scheme in 2002. Plot holders 
became out-growers for NSK in 2003 and 2004, 
with a profit sharing arrangement. However, as in 
Veeplaas, NSK was late in delivering fertilizers, so 
planting dates were delayed. Moreover, the dam 
provisioning water ran dry, while wages were high. 
This contributed to severe losses for most in spite 
of hard work. Pensions had to be used to pay 
laborers. They also forfeited their maize as a food 
security buffer. Farmers were deeply disappointed 
(Tapela 2009, 2016b). 
Early 2000s: Government’s Revitalization 
of Smallholder Irrigation Schemes 
The piloting of out-grower arrangements with NSK 
in Phetwane was one of the government’s efforts 
across the province by the LDARD to design a 
participatory strategy to re-establish irrigation 
(Shaker 2005). From 1998 onwards, participatory 
planning to revitalize irrigation with self-chosen 
crops was piloted in three irrigation schemes, 
followed by a first and second phase of a Land 
Care project. By 2004, it had extended to 28 
irrigation schemes, including farms in the Flag 
Boshielo irrigation scheme. Although the political 
6 The initial name was Northern Province Department of Agriculture, Land and Environment. This changed to Limpopo Department of 
Agriculture, and later into Limpopo Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, which is the name used in this report.
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context of South Africa with its dismantled state 
and transformation to a newly configured state 
was unique, some references were made to 
‘irrigation management transfer’. This placed this 
policy change in the global trend of the time of 
irrigation management transfer and participatory 
irrigation management. However, the name soon 
became ‘Revitalization of Smallholder Irrigation 
Schemes’ (RESIS). 
As mentioned, RESIS envisaged spending 
a total amount of USD 108,688,000 over 5 
years (2005-2009). During this period, the plan 
was to revitalize 126 schemes, including the 
Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme. The total area 
envisaged was about 19,730 ha and directly 
involved 12,432 farmers7. The replacement 
value of the infrastructure was estimated at 
USD 400 million; this infrastructure was “mostly 
dilapidated, moribund and non-productive” 
(Shaker 2005). RESIS aimed at rebuilding and 
socially uplifting a profitable agribusiness through 
a “comprehensive programme to structure, 
train and capacitate smallholder farmers to run 
their scheme profitably and sustainably” (DAFF 
2015). An integrated and participatory process-
oriented approach was adopted, with extensive 
investments in human capital, besides investing in 
the upgrading of infrastructure. RESIS envisaged 
a flexible response to a wider range of community 
priorities, including homestead food production. 
It considered multiple uses of water, livestock 
and scheme interrelationships, and dryland crop 
production (Denison and Manona 2011).
RESIS paid less attention to land tenure 
issues and ownership of the infrastructure. 
Machethe et al. (2004) also commented that 
RESIS paid limited attention to the much needed 
reform of the input, mechanization, extension and 
marketing support structures. The same authors 
also found that “access to information about 
appropriate technology remains a major problem.” 
However, by the end of 2004, the new 
leadership of the LDARD radically abandoned 
this approach, changing the name to ‘RESIS 
Recharge’. As discussed next, this built on 
another initiative by agribusiness in Elandskraal. 
In RESIS Recharge, the government took control 
of land and water technologies and transferred 
all production out of farmers’ hands to a strategic 
partner, while leaving farmers with substantive 
r isks. Thus, RESIS Recharge became an 
engineering centered reconstruction of dilapidated 
infrastructure, focusing on investments in bulk 
water supply and in-field irrigation infrastructure 
(Denison and Manona 2007). It introduced a new 
configuration of the triangle of the government, 
farmers and service providers, in which the 
strategic partner obtained a confusing role of 
service provider or agribusiness or both.  
Mid-2000s: RESIS Recharge 
Elandskraal
RESIS Recharge was inspired by another 
initiative: the Elandskraal Balima Irrigation Scheme 
(EBIS) Trust. Elandskraal lies on the left bank 
of the Olifants River opposite Mogalatsane (see 
Figure 1). It is a Trust Land farm, in which a 
total of 223 smallholders lease land from the 
LDARD and form the umbrella Elandskraal 
Balemi Irrigation Scheme Cooperative. From 
2000 onwards, the national Department of Public 
Works, in collaboration with the LDARD, and 
in partnership with the ‘Elandskraal Community 
Production Center’, upgraded 150 ha with center 
pivots (Sigcau 2002). President Mbeki visited the 
scheme in 2001 in the long route to accountability. 
Already in 2001, some of the Elandskraal 
farmers had initiated a joint venture with a large-
scale farmer who traded as a private company, 
7 The Department of Agriculture also protected the well-defined water rights of the smallholders in the ever-growing competition over water. 
In this case, various mines, organized in the Lebalelo WUA, wanted to take water out of the Olifants River downstream of the irrigation farms 
to pipe the water to mines. The WUA asked the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Water to lease the water rights of the 
smallholders for 5 years. The mines also committed to raise the Arabie Dam by 5 m at their own cost by 2006. This would ensure more water 
for mining in the wide surroundings. In return for the five-year lease, the mines committed to finance an irrigation canal directly from the dam 
to the fields downstream. Implementation of the canal by consultants was mediocre and it has never been used. None of the farmers were 
included in these negotiations (interview with provincial official).
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AWC (Tapela 2009). In 2005, 18 farmers with 
5 to 10 ha plots organized themselves as the 
Elandskraal Balemi Irrigation Scheme Trust 
(EBIS-Trust) on the 150 ha of irrigable land, 
and signed a bilateral contract with this strategic 
partner. In this contract, the strategic partner 
committed to use his skills for mechanized 
irrigated production and to use his access to 
capital, input suppliers and marketing channels 
for the entire cultivation and marketing process. 
He would decide about the production process in 
consultation with the cooperative. The contract 
also committed him to build the commercial and 
technical capacity of the farmers. In return, he 
would receive 70% of the net income in the first 
year, 60% in the second year and 50% in later 
years, leaving the remaining amount, or the risk 
of losses, with the cooperative. The contract 
was silent on how the remainder of the harvest 
should be allocated (Tapela 2009).  
In the contract, farmers, on the other hand, 
committed to consolidate their plots into one 
pooled farm as required for the centralized center 
pivots, and to vacate the land to the strategic 
partner. They also agreed to organize into a 
collective and manage all intra-group matters. 
The contract further stipulated the obligation to 
provide any labor, as far as that was still needed 
in this capital-intensive and labor-saving mode 
of production. The duration of this contract 
between AWC and the EBIS-Trust was 10 years 
(Tapela 2009). This was essentially a bilateral 
sharecropping arrangement between plot holders 
and cultivator, with specific mutually agreed 
conditions, in a clear and effective short route 
to accountability. The government’s role was 
limited to the prior investments in the irrigation 
equipment. Its role in the accountability triangle 
was enabling only, although the government 
maintained the power of leasing out the Trust 
land8. The joint venture faced major community-
level organizational issues, including land issues 
within the community and between community 
members and outsiders. Later, land issues led 
to a temporary stop, in which task teams were 
formed that were seen as legitimate by all parties 
involved, to solve (Tapela 2016a).
The Contract in RESIS Recharge 
The new leadership of LDARD decided to do 
away with the participatory design of RESIS 
immediately and replace this by RESIS Recharge 
as the exclusive option for other schemes in 
Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme and elsewhere. 
Most schemes were to be managed by the same 
strategic partner as in Elandskraal: AWC.  
Bringing agribusiness on board seemed 
to fill the gap that was left when the pre-1994 
managerial structures were dismantled. It 
resonated well with a strong discourse in South 
Africa and elsewhere at the time about the above-
mentioned advantages of agribusiness. In the 
past, substantive state subsidies were needed 
for the agricultural management parastatals, and 
companies that handled all forward and backward 
linkages, managed production with the out-
growers, absorbed the government’s production 
risks and somewhat cushioned farmers’ risks, for 
example, through lenient credit arrangements. In 
RESIS Recharge, all cultivation was outsourced 
to the one single skilled large-scale farmer, AWC. 
He had good contacts in the input and produce 
markets of South Africa’s agribusiness; he owned 
sophisticated labor-saving technologies; and had 
capital to pay for inputs without needing a loan. 
However, as analyzed by Tapela (2009), there 
were essential differences between the largely 
bilateral contract of mutual accountability between 
the strategic partner and the Elandskraal farmers, 
on the one hand, and the tripartite contract 
between the LDARD, the strategic partner and 
the farmers’ cooperatives in the subsequent joint 
ventures, on the other hand, as explained below. 
The farmer cooperatives had to give up 
their land and existing water infrastructure, but 
had no other role than waiting for their share, 
which was set at 50%, of the net profits that the 
strategic partner was contractually obliged to give. 
There was no further accountability to them, for 
8 Later, these land leases became fraught with capture and conflicts. These became the main reason why the Elandskraal joint venture also 
halted (Tapela 2016a).
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example, on how the net profits were calculated. 
The contract also committed that the farmers 
would provide unskilled labor at the request of the 
strategic partner. Thus, contractually, smallholders 
could only sit and wait for money as “armchair 
farmers” or “glorified laborers” (Tapela 2009). 
The only other commitment by the strategic 
partner vis-à-vis the farmers was that he should 
train them in the areas of finance, quality control, 
marketing and management, and operational, 
technical  and business operat ions.  This 
ignores agronomic training about crop varieties 
or crop water requirements, and misses any 
sustainable new access to input and capital 
suppliers, and output markets. So, the farmers 
would be trained as business clerks instead of 
competitive producers. Anyhow, the contract 
remained silent about ‘how’ and about any 
monitoring of compliance, let alone dealing with 
non-compliance. Thus, contractually, the strategic 
partner could ‘get away’ without capacity building 
and transfer of skills or technologies. Even better 
for the strategic partner, he could always refer any 
complaints of the cooperative to the LDARD.
In the RESIS Recharge contracts, the 
LDARD included itself on behalf of the smallholder 
cooperative. In the contract, the address of the 
cooperative was the address of LDARD. However, 
there is no downward accountability stipulated. Even 
though the contract mentions ‘a board’ of all three 
parties, the cooperative had nowhere to go in case 
of conflicts with one of the other parties, or with both. 
Remarkably, the contract was silent about 
the role of the LDARD in land and water rights, 
and infrastructure provision. Formally, land in 
irrigation schemes is state land. In this case, 
the LDARD silently endorsed the contractual 
obligation of the farmer cooperative to hand over 
land to the strategic partner. More significantly, 
the government installed expensive new irrigation 
infrastructure, but this was not mentioned in 
the contract. This infrastructure was an internal 
arrangement within the government. Within 
the government, accountability is upward from 
the provincial department leadership to state 
officials and treasury. The ability to plan for lots 
of funds and visibly spend can even be seen 
as well performing9. The issue of outcomes can 
be relegated to the future (such outcome-based 
service delivery was strongly emphasized in the 
later National Development Plan 2030)10. 
In this space, the former state – white 
irrigation industry constellation – was revitalized 
in to  a  more rac ia l ly  mixed one.  LDARD 
unilaterally decided to rehabilitate all joint 
ventures with an expensive and new ‘floppy’ 
technology. This consisted of elevated pipes 
stretched out over the entire field with many 
turning sprinklers (‘floppies’). A single provider 
in Nelspruit had just started to promote this. The 
monopoly position of this provider implied that 
there was no need to tender among a range of 
competing irrigation equipment manufacturers, 
as would have been the case for the common 
center pivots. The consultancy firm that had 
worked in the Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme 
during the apartheid era was commissioned to 
create the irrigation designs. 
Significantly, the strategic partner was 
initially not keen to work with this experimental 
technology. After several years of gaining 
experience with floppies, both the strategic partner 
and the LDARD reverted to center pivots in the 
most recent joint venture in Strydkraal. However, 
when the joint ventures started, AWC was “one 
of the three persons in South Africa who knows 
how to operate a floppy system” (Sithole 2011). 
Nevertheless, in spite of this reluctance, the deal 
was sufficiently attractive for the strategic partner: 
free provision of land and irrigation infrastructure 
that allowed full, centralized control over its 
operation – as floppies do, plus half of the net 
profits, without any accountability to anyone on 
how those profits were calculated.
9 An example of reporting on performance to parliament that entirely focuses on spending patterns rather than outcomes is on the parliamentary 
monitoring group’s website (https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/8720/ - accessed May 15, 2017).
10 This report focuses on the structural issues of the government’s accountable service delivery, but, expectedly, rumours of corruption 
abounded in RESIS Recharge and other infrastructure work in the Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme. Allegations were that money for canals 
never led to even a single crop. Budgets for repair and maintenance quadrupled overnight. In 2009, Limpopo’s Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts (Scopa) wanted the province's agriculture head charged with fraud and corruption (Makana 2009). Yet, he reappeared in the Africa 
Davos Debates of 2010 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3r0wcooR5-I).    
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In line with the intense national debates about 
Black Economic Empowerment at the time11, 
the agribusiness and irrigation business also 
became more racially mixed on the ground. The 
LDARD’s extension worker at Elandskraal started 
trading under the name of Temong, and soon 
became both the Black Economic Empowerment 
partner of AWC and the co-owner of the Nelspruit 
manufacturing company of floppy systems12. 
The new partnerships of the Black Economic 
Empowerment partner may have strengthened 
the case for the leadership to mobilize funding 
at higher government levels. However, it made 
the technology choice and joint venture even less 
transparent for the Elandskraal and other farmers. 
As perceived by the Elandskraal farmers, just by 
his mere presence, the extension worker garnered 
financial benefits. Many smallholders were to raise 
this as a major grievance (Tapela 2009).
In order to further strengthen the case towards 
skeptics within and outside the government, a 
public discourse was created of fast progress and 
effective delivery: RESIS Recharge was glorified 
as a ‘commercial’ and ‘business-like’ approach that 
was suggested to finally lead to ‘economic viability’ 
of self-financed profitable farming, which would all 
be transferred to smallholders. Floppy systems 
were hailed as the symbol of South Africa’s 
homegrown, sophisticated, commercial expertise 
on water-efficient and highly productive mechanized 
agricultural technology (various interviews). In this 
publicity campaign, farming for household food 
security, let alone constitutional rights to water or 
food, were ridiculed, and became an immediate 
criterion for disqualification and exclusion as 
backward and prohibiting progress (Tapela 2009; 
various interviews). 
So, the ‘contractual’ arrangements in RESIS 
Recharge promised quick, uncontested profits for 
the floppy manufacturing industry and uncontested 
performance for the official. It gave freedom to 
the strategic partner to access prime land and 
operate costly new water infrastructure, without 
accountability to farmers except for sharing the 
net profits (without transparency how that was 
calculated) and providing training. Moreover, 
under RESIS Recharge, the strategic partner 
and farmers shared the gains but also the risk 
of losses. This shifted the production risks from 
the government to the strategic partner (who was 
willing to take this) and also to smallholders. 
The risks for the smallholders were indeed 
high. By being obliged to hand over land with 
infrastructure, they forfeited alternative livelihood 
opportunities with the land and water. They 
already lost these opportunities from the start of 
the construction phase onwards. Construction 
could take up to 6 years. Each year, they shared 
the risks of crop failure and net income losses 
with the strategic partner. Farmers also bore 
the risks of the largely untested technology of 
floppy systems, as decided upon by others. 
Smallholders’ land became an experimentation 
field, but without insurance in case of failure. 
The contract was short, just 3 years. There was 
no exit strategy except that the strategic partner 
would hand over all shares to the cooperative or 
‘anyone appointed by the LDARD. The contract had 
no provision for depreciation and re-capitalization 
after the life cycle of infrastructure of some 10-15 
years. This all provided little incentive to the strategic 
partner to consider sustainability.
In sum, f rom the very beginning,  the 
contract in RESIS Recharge about the tripartite 
relationships between the state, agribusiness as 
assumed service provider and farmers gave all 
space for the government, irrigation industry and 
strategic partner to do as they saw fit, as long as 
the strategic partner shared net profits (however 
calculated) and provided some business training. 
There was no contractual power for the main 
short- and long-term risk takers: the farmers. They 
became even more dependent on the government 
and agribusiness than before in the hope of 
getting money for free. This recipe for failure 
unfolded as explained below. 
11 This was also the time when the names of the dam and scheme changed to ‘Flag Boshielo’ irrigation scheme, and the Afrikaner names of 
the farms became African. 
12 For the extension worker’s establishment of another, partly overlapping, irrigation group in Elandskraal, and the court case on serious land 
conflicts, see Tapela (2009, 2016a). 
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Implementation of RESIS Recharge
Plot Holders’ Organization and 
Construction 
After these top-down decisions, LDARD contacted 
smallholders in the Boshielo irrigation scheme and 
provided them with the option to revitalize their 
irrigation sub-schemes with floppy systems. None 
of the communities were eager to consolidate 
all plots and give it up for years of construction 
of an unknown irrigation system. However, 
LDARD’s approach was ‘either this or nothing’. 
For example, farmers in De Paarl expressed 
serious doubts and their preference for food 
crops, but ‘didn’t hear from LDARD thereafter’. 
In Phetwane, farmers were especially reticent 
because of the recent negative experiences of 
cotton farming (Tapela 2009). In the end, there 
was agreement that LDARD continued with the 
four upstream farms (Phetwane, Mogalatsane, 
Kolekotela and Setlaboswana) and with one 
downstream (Strydkraal). 
In the organization of the plot holders into a 
cooperative, younger men actively came forward 
even if they did not have plots, as they were 
attracted by the ‘money’ to be gained. Moreover, 
as an elderly woman commented, young men 
know English and may have knowledge of 
computers. The influence of tribal authorities in 
the cooperative’s committee varied. While Chief 
Matlala had a certain voice in Phetwane, Chief 
Masemola’s influence in Setlaboswana was less 
pronounced. Chief Masha’s influence in Strydkraal 
was initially strong, but increasingly contested, as 
elaborated further below. 
The compos i t ion  o f  members  o f  the 
cooperatives seemed quite inclusive and gender 
balanced, although no in-depth research is 
available on this issue. This relatively equal 
or dominant membership by women seemed 
well aligned to earlier de facto plot ownership, 
irrespective of PTOs, and reflected women’s 
domination in cultivation and men’s relative 
absence due to out-migration. Dividends were 
generally proportionate to plot size. If two people 
shared a plot, they also had to share dividends. 
In Kolekotela, the new floppy system did not 
cover all plots. While some cooperatives excluded 
those plot holders, others included them in the 
new cooperative. Yet, this land consolidation 
and organization came at a high price. Many 
smallholders kept regretting, as some respondents 
mentioned: “Before, we had our own plots; 
they were indicated with pegs. But now, we 
cannot even access our own plot.” Moreover, 
during the vacation of the land and construction 
phase between 2005 and 2008, 2009 or later, 
all informal irrigation gardens along the canals, 
especially by elderly women, were removed 
without any form of compensation. 
In Strydkraal, a range of initiatives took place. 
In 2008, a small joint venture got a floppy system 
that covered 20 ha. This was located in the part 
of the former irrigation scheme that could not 
be irrigated anymore with the pumps, because 
of major flood damage in 2002. This had 18 
members. Reinforcing the glory of modern, large-
scale technology, AWC even “used to come with 
a plane to spray chemicals” on the 20 ha floppy 
scheme, as commented by community members.
In addition, 13 ha were equipped, out of 
which AWC cultivated 8 ha, and provided water 
for free to a 5-ha vegetable garden of a women’s 
group, Ikageng, with 10 members. In 2012, 
LDARD finalized a new joint venture with AWC 
by transforming former dryland into 257 ha of 
new center pivots, with an extension to include 
the center pivot that had been operated previously 
by Farmer B (whose 1997 contract had ended). 
The 263 members of this new cooperative, 
mostly women, included all earlier plot holders of 
the Strydkraal irrigation scheme and also some 
from the earlier Mooiplaas irrigation scheme. For 
this large, new scheme, called ‘Mooiplaas’, the 
strategic partner pumps water out of the gravity 
canal, which is fed by the weir in the Olifants 
River, into a high reservoir. He also maintains the 
canal up to that site. On yet another site, three 
center pivots were installed with 33 members. 
An apex cooperative, Likamamos, was formed. 
This includes the 20 ha floppy system, the 5 ha 
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women’s garden, and the new large and smaller 
center pivot schemes. With strong support from 
the chief, the female leader of the women’s 
garden and a man became the leaders of this 
apex cooperative. 
Production in RESIS Recharge
Table 2 provides an overview of the joint 
ventures: name, area (size of the farm), number 
of cooperative members, crops, and technology/
irrigated cropping seasons (LDARD; Tapela 2009; 
Sithole 2011; Barbara van Koppen field notes). 
Collapse and Troubled Continuity
Disappointing Dividends
In the first years, in particular, dividends for the 
cooperative members were in the order of USD 
200-800 per cropping season. However, in later 
years, dividends tended to reduce. In the case 
of potatoes, this was possibly due to declining 
soil fertility. However, in each farm, there were 
already seasons with net losses, as announced by 
AWC, so the community did not receive anything. 
This hit hard. AWC’s proposition to even put the 
losses on the cooperatives’ next year’s accounts 
TABLE 2. Characteristics of joint ventures in the Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme as in 2017 (i.e., ‘to date’).
Name Area (ha) Number of Crops Years of 
(former name)  cooperative   functioning  
  members     
  (female [%])  
Elandskraal Balemi  197 12 Maize, cotton, Center pivots 
Irrigation Scheme Trusta  150 for EBIS Trust  wheat, vegetables 2005-2016 
   
Phetwane 52 56 Potatoes, maize Floppies 2009- 
(Hindustan)  (70%)  to date 
 
Mogalatsane 133 98 Potatoes, maize Floppies 
(Coetzeesdraai)    2009-2012
 
Kolekotela 243 202 Potatoes, maize Floppies 
(Krokodilheuwel) (220 floppy) (48%)  2009-2011
 
Setlaboswana 114 96 Potatoes, maize Floppies 
(Vogelstruiskoppie)  (49%)   2009-2011
 
Strydkraal and Until the end of the  Floppy: 18 Vegetables Floppies, 
Mooiplaas 1990s - 338 ha Ikageng, garden: maize, wheat center pivorts 
  10 women   2008 - to date 
 2008 - to date:  
 floppies 20 ha
 2008 - to date:  15 center 
 sprinkler 13 ha  pivots: 
 (with 5 ha for  296 (mostly 
 Ikageng women’s  women) 
 garden and  
 8 ha by AWC)
 2012 - to date:  
 15 center pivots  
 on 300 ha 
Sources: LDARD; Tapela 2009; Sithole 2011; Barbara van Koppen field notes.
Notes: 
a See Tapela (2009) for the Kgotlelo Balemi Irrigation Cooperative established in 2008 with Temong. 
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was totally unacceptable. LDARD also refused 
to chip in. Government officials emphasized that 
such variability is inevitable in commercial farming 
and that ‘communities should understand this’. 
Conflicts about various issues arose, especially in 
the years with losses. 
As a result, by 2012, all four upstream farms 
had stopped working with AWC, two of them 
before expiry of the three-year contract. Only 
one scheme, Phetwane, is still operational with 
another strategic partner and still requires major 
government subsidies. The other three farms 
have been abandoned, fell into disrepair and got 
vandalized. They now depend on the next rounds 
of public support for repair. In the floppy systems 
in Mogalatsane, the LDARD started rehabilitation 
of the schemes once again. In 2014, AWC also 
stopped the joint venture on the brand new 276 
ha scheme in Strydkraal. 
The Contentious Issues
Among the conflicts that particularly escalated 
in years of claimed net losses, the single most 
important issue was the lack of transparency 
about the strategic partner’s business. The 
farm enterprise, its expenditure and income, 
as well as other farm operations lacked any 
t ransparency to the cooperat ives.  When 
cooperative smallholders tried to search for 
clarity about the income gained from the sale or 
other farm budget items, they only managed to 
talk to AWC’s farm managers as the middlemen 
who were regularly on site. These middlemen 
(and AWC himself) typically referred to the 
LDARD for any questions. However, the LDARD 
failed to provide clarity on AWC’s farm budgets 
either, probably because they did not know. 
Another allegation was that AWC had hardly 
given any training at all to community members 
– neither active on-the-job training nor any formal 
training. In the four upstream farms, two persons of 
each farm were trained as pump operators; one of 
them, fascinated by the high technology, stated how 
he could ‘switch the pump on and off at a distance 
from his mobile’. Two others were trained in health 
and safety issues. One person was trained in 
operating the floppy irrigation system (Tapela 2009). 
In Strydkraal, a respondent stated how AWC called 
people for training. Five people went, but it then 
appeared that ‘a person needed to have knowledge 
of maths and physics’ to be selected for the training. 
Four people were sent back for that reason and 
then the last one also went back. 
The other promised benefit of the joint 
venture was paid employment. Job opportunities 
were in high demand and the cooperatives 
diligently registered for the work provided and the 
payment. Security guards and the pump operator 
got full-time jobs. However, jobs had been 
limited as most operations were mechanized. In 
Mogalatsane, for example, planting provided 2 
days of work to 100 persons, while harvesting 
provided 2 days of labor to 60 people. The wage 
was USD 5 per day, so below the minimum wage. 
The conflicts had different implications in the 
five joint ventures on the right bank of the Olifants 
River scheme.
Phetwane
In Phetwane, women farmers complained that 
AWC ‘even came in the night to put chemicals, 
so that the community did not know what he did’. 
After two winter seasons of cultivating potatoes 
from 2009-2011, they felt that ‘enough is enough’. 
AWC decided to stop the contract and the 
Phetwane smallholders continued on their own, 
while LDARD still paid for some (but insufficient) 
fertilizer, other inputs, the electricity bill, tractor 
services and infrastructure repairs. The income 
from local sales was very low: just enough to pay 
the laborers. Lack of transparency on accounting 
issues continued to divide the committees. 
Regular election of new committees failed to 
bring real solutions. Only in 2015 did production 
increase again with a new, self-selected strategic 
partner and continued support from LDARD 
(Tapela 2016a). President Zuma visited this 
‘success story’ in 2013. 
The Collapsed Joint Ventures 
Internal tensions emerged in Mogalatsane. The 
committee’s news that AWC had announced there 
were losses was met with considerable suspicion 
among members that money had disappeared 
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in the pockets of the committee members. New 
committees were elected, but with continued 
lack of information from AWC nothing changed 
(Mapedza et al. 2016).
In Setlaboswana, there was suspicion among 
several young men about AWC’s claims of losses, 
in spite of – as they stated – the ‘truck loads of 
potatoes that left the field’. This was the reason 
why these young men travelled to the potato 
buyer to check. In 2010, they even opened a 
court case with the paid support of a lawyer from 
Pretoria to defend their case. However, given the 
contract, their chances of winning the case were 
slim, while litigation costs were very high. Debates 
on how to handle this conflict split the cooperative 
(Mapedza et al. 2016). 
Thus, with growing internal tensions, these 
cooperatives bore the brunt of the losses and 
the lack of transparency about the ‘big cake’. 
However, even the ‘crumbs of the cake’ caused 
conflicts. For example, AWC suggested that the 
remnants of the potato harvest were free for 
picking by any villager, while the cooperatives 
tended to see those benefits as the reward of 
cooperative members only. 
The losses for the three discontinued 
cooperat ives were not conf ined to these 
disappointing short-term gains. The long-term 
losses were forfeited alternative uses of the 
barren land and water, including the former 
informal uses of the canals and reduced soil 
fertility. Moreover, vandalism and theft of copper 
cables and transformers became rife as soon as 
the cooperatives had decided to discontinue with 
AWC. The pooling of land into one scheme, in 
which ‘people didn’t know their land anymore’, 
as mentioned above, further disempowered 
communities to regain control.
The smallholders lost considerably more than 
the other two partners in the triangle, who kept 
their jobs (government) or did good business 
and expanded their expertise without longer-term 
risks (agribusiness). The commercial irrigation 
manufacturers and designers sold expensive 
equipment with a view to gaining as much 
profit as possible; they piloted innovative floppy 
equipment without risks; ensured that any future 
breakdown of the floppies would warrant the 
company’s expertise and products for repair and 
rehabilitation; and they further carved out a niche 
in the competitive market of irrigation equipment 
manufacturers. 
The gains for the strategic partner were the 
main ‘catch 22’ of the RESIS Recharge joint 
ventures. Both the strategic partner and the 
cooperatives shared a similar goal of quick wins 
for profit. Dividends were the main and highly 
appreciated benefits for the cooperatives. AWC 
also went for quick wins and dividends in his 
trade-offs between either spending his scarce 
time on capital-intensive production and sale for 
maximum profits or spending time on training of 
business clerks, as stipulated in the contract. He 
had no incentive at all to go beyond the contract 
and take time to answer questions about - already 
complex - farm budgets, let alone proactively 
inform or even train smallholders in finances. 
Similarly, there was no incentive at all for the 
strategic partner to reduce the sophisticated 
mechanization in order to employ more wage 
laborers with the likely logistic issues or else the 
labor conflicts; to facilitate new relationships of 
trust between the smallholder cooperatives and 
his own input providers and outlet channels, which 
he had built during a lifetime at high transaction 
costs and which were historically rooted in 
the white agribusiness that had been forged 
over a century to outcompete black producers 
and subjugate them to consumers and wage 
laborers. Lastly, the strategic partner bore no 
risks of long-term resource degradation and other 
externalities. So, his cultivation of potatoes during 
several subsequent seasons served quick wins 
but reduced fertility. As an irrigation consultant 
commented, no commercial farmer would do that 
on their own land. Thus, a strategic partner is not 
a priori a service provider. 
Paradoxically, the government got squeezed 
in the tripartite relationship. An extension worker 
stated how he had tried to facil itate more 
communication between the smallholders and 
the strategic partner, but some smallholders 
misinterpreted his genuine attempts and were 
suspicious that he ‘did not want smallholders to 
progress’. This rendered the extension worker 
hesitant to try again.
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Strydkraal
In Strydkraal, the lack of transparency took 
another turn. Learning from earlier experiences of 
the chief’s contract with Farmer B and the smaller 
floppy schemes in Strydkraal, and experiences 
in the other four joint ventures, Chief Masha and 
the apex cooperative leadership negotiated more 
transparency from AWC. The leadership of the 
apex cooperative assertively claimed to keep 
accounts of the inputs, number of trucks leaving 
the fields and income gained. They also insisted 
on jointly deciding about the crop. Unlike the 
upstream cooperatives, the Strydkraal cooperative 
resisted the cultivation of potatoes because of the 
soil depletion and the risk of plant disease when 
potatoes are grown in consecutive seasons. 
However, in the eyes of some members, 
all this information failed to be sufficiently 
communicated to them. This escalated when 
there were no profits. Chief Masha had already 
been ‘under siege of his subjects’ in the land 
restitution claim to the land in Kalkfontein 
from which the community had been forcefully 
removed in the 1950s. In that claim, some 
of his ‘subjects’ challenged the chieftaincy’s 
power and claimed an equal status in the 
Community Property Association that was given 
the land for exploitation. The same contest 
spilled over to the apex cooperative. Younger 
male members lodged a strong case to both 
the apex leadership and the LDARD to provide 
full transparency about investments made in 
Strydkraal. During the same time, the house 
of the woman cooperative leader was burned. 
Probably being more vulnerable as a woman, 
she left to live elsewhere. When AWC decided 
to leave Strydkraal, the young male members 
negotiated with the same Farmer B to return 
as a strategic partner to Strydkraal for the new 
large scheme. Women, the majority of members 
of the new ‘Mooiplaas’ scheme, avoided being 
drawn into this conflict, bearing the brunt of intra-
community conflict in this village as well (Barbara 
van Koppen, field notes).
LDARD’s strict focus on joint ventures implied 
that all other irrigated farms that had collapsed 
remained without support. The situation was 
the same for the many other inhabitants in the 
Flag Boshielo area, for which the original RESIS 
program had also envisaged support. Some 
cooperative members and, in particular, those who 
had been excluded altogether found other land 
and water to be used for production. This was 
partly in response to the collapse of the irrigation 
schemes, but also due to dwindling employment 
opportunities or to the still untapped profit-making 
investment opportunities of the fertile land and 
water. For most micro- and small-scale farmers, 
production was a basic survival need. Some 
examples are explained below.   
Informal Water Development
In the farms that had been rejected as candidates 
for joint ventures, individual farmers started to 
use the abandoned infrastructure as needed. 
Thus, farmers ‘redesigned’ the canal from the 
Piet Gouws Dam through punctures leading water 
through long furrows to individuals’ fields, some 
of which were as large as 5 ha (Tapela 2009). 
In Mooiplaas, a wealthier relative of Chief Masha 
living in Johannesburg started to invest in an area 
adjacent to the river that is prone to damage from 
flooding. Such lands are generally seen as too 
risky by the LDARD to be used for full-fledged 
development.
Poor men and women also took up artisanal 
fisheries with very small nets in the river and 
dam to meet basic livelihood needs. However, 
government officials chased them for fishing 
without a license.
The various water sources and a variety of 
technologies, including diversions from rivers 
or canals, small mechanized pumps, rainwater 
harvesting and wetland uses, also provided 
water for livestock, brick making and small-
scale enterprises, especially at homesteads. 
Water supplies to homesteads played a major 
role. It had been a central focus in the vibrant 
community initiatives during the 1990s when the 
country moved to liberation. In the Flag Boshielo 
area, development forums of 63 villages had 
spontaneously organized to compile an inventory 
of existing water points and their status. They 
27
proposed to provide for 50 liters per capita per 
day. They offered their insights and readiness to 
assist with the construction of pipes to the Lepelle 
Northern Water Board. This Board had started 
constructing a treatment plant just below the 
Flag Boshielo Dam with the intention of providing 
drinking water to downstream villages. However, 
the Lepelle Northern Water Board rejected 
this support (MaTshepo Khumbane, grassroots 
activist, pers. comm. March 25, 2004). 
Twenty years later, the Board provided 
piped water to part of the Olifants River scheme 
only. As studied in the four upstream villages 
(Tapela 2009), the water supply was also used 
for homestead cultivation, in addition to using 
it for drinking and other domestic purposes. 
This improved food security for many more 
households in the village, including households 
that had no plot in the scheme. Over time, that 
proportion had grown, for example, to 75% of all 
households in Phetwane and 38% in Kolekotela. 
They had also lost access to the informal 
gardens along the canals.  
However, the Lepelle Northern Water Board 
charged significant payments. Allegedly, this 
was only for any water quantities above the 
6,000 liters per household per day, the cut-off 
point in South Africa’s Free Basic Water Policy. 
In all four villages, the average consumption 
was less than 6,000 liters per household per 
day, but water users were still charged for this 
‘free’ basic water (Tapela 2009). Water bills 
were sometimes extraordinarily high. Villagers 
generally realized that non-payment of this 
water will be unsustainable in the long term. 
Even households (with household connections 
and meters) that failed to pay bills in the short 
term refrained from using much water, fearing 
high water bills at a later stage. Some other 
households had installed illegal connections 
without a meter, partly because of the delays. 
Where possible, households continued using 
wa te r  f rom communa l  bo reho les  o f  the 
apartheid era. For the poorest households 
who had no connection at all, these boreholes 
were the only source of water. Households 
that even lacked access to a borehole asked 
neighbors for permission to use their water 
supplies, or they went to the river and canals 
(Tapela 2009).  
In downstream Strydkraal, an area not 
served by the Lepelle Northern Water Board, the 
municipality failed to provide any water either from 
pre-1994 or post-1994 boreholes, reservoirs or 
piped gravity schemes. The reservoir appeared 
to be too small to provide water to the rapidly 
expanding population. In the absence of adequate 
state support, private water vendors with donkey 
carts or cars took up the task of supplying water. 
They sold a 200 liter drum of water for USD 2 or 
USD 3. Some women used and reused this very 
expensive water to irrigate the vegetables and 
trees in their homesteads. So, in Strydkraal, state-
subsidized, high-tech floppy systems abundantly 
irrigated over 300 ha of crops, while women paid 
very high prices for water or carried dirty water 
with buckets and wheelbarrows from nearby 
gravity canals, or even worse from the distant, 
crocodile-infested Olifants River. 
In Strydkraal, MaTshepo Khumbane, founding 
member of the Water for Food Movement, bridged 
this gap bottom up. Through mind mobilization 
workshops for all, including the poorest ‘nobodies’, 
she encouraged participants to design plans 
for their own homesteads as the space where 
women, in particular, can start exerting control 
over their lives. She trained them in the harvesting 
of runoff and roof water in underground tanks. 
Together with weather charting and soil fertility 
measures, she encouraged the use and reuse 
of this water for vegetable cultivation or small-
scale enterprises for home consumption and sale. 
With the escalating conflicts in the Strydkraal 
cooperative, women reverted back to this option 
(Barbara van Koppen, field notes). 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis of 
events within and outside the joint ventures, we 
now turn to the lessons learned in the national 
Irrigation Strategy and provide recommendations 
on how to further operationalize the proposed 
activities in the accountability triangle between the 
state, service providers and farmers.   
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Discussion, Conclusions and Recommendations 
Policy Framework
The foregoing findings about joint ventures in 
the Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme corroborate 
the current government’s policies, as mentioned 
in the Introduction. This holds for the general 
agricultural policies that emphasize diversity 
and differentiate between different typologies 
of smallholders (subsistence and homestead-
based production; smallholders in ‘loose’ and 
‘tight’ value chains; and independent commercial 
smallholders). The findings also corroborate the 
importance of the national Irrigation Strategy, in 
general (participatory planning with full respect 
for farmers’ preferences and holistic interventions 
that consider all aspects, avoiding that projects 
primarily focus on infrastructure construction). 
Specifically, the present analysis supports that 
the option of joint ventures with its three potential 
advantages remains, but explicitly as only one of 
the options and with specific additional conditions 
(stop encouraging joint ventures with strategic 
partners from the top down, and only accept joint 
ventures for funding if farmers were contractually 
and factually involved as decision makers; ensure 
that the strategic partner transfers skills; and 
monitor the joint venture’s contractual agreements 
and mediate in conflict resolution). The findings 
suggest that these conditions can be further 
specified as explained below.    
Enabling and Monitoring the Short Route 
to Accountability 
The importance of a strong, short route to 
accountability (farmers’ decision making in a 
bilateral contract with the strategic partner) was 
confirmed. The three continuing joint ventures 
started with a self-chosen strategic partner and 
bilateral contract (Elandskraal) or moved to that 
(Phetwane and Strydkraal). Smallholders’ option to 
choose among strategic partners enhances their 
bargaining position. 
The choice can also be widened to other 
modes of farming. Out-grower arrangements, as 
in the short period of cotton cultivation, could 
be revived with better mutual compliance and 
risk management. Another arrangement in the 
Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme is the leasing 
of land to a farm manager for a fixed amount, 
as done by the tribal authorities in Strydkraal to 
Farmer B from 1997 to 2007, and in Veeplaas to 
Farmer B since 2001. However, in Veeplaas, the 
lease amounts paid were low. Comparison with a 
market value would empower them. 
Experience in the Flag Boshielo irrigation 
scheme showed the negative impacts of the 
weak contents and limited monitoring of the 
contract in RESIS Recharge. Hence, in addition 
to the sharing arrangements of inputs, production 
process and benefits in the contract, it is 
recommended that more attention is given to the 
following: 
•  Governance structures that ensure full 
transparency and an equal, if not a majority, 
say for smallholders.
•  Feasible enforcement arrangements, as well 
as equitable conflict resolution procedures, 
in which the government may assume a 
fallback role. 
•  A further specification of which and whose 
skills are to be improved, how and when. 
This would go beyond business clerks and 
include: transfer of skilled farm labor and farm 
management, and effective smallholder access 
to agribusiness input and marketing networks. 
•  Options for more employment generation, 
instead of full-blown mechanization. 
•  Ways to deal with externalities and longer-
term risks. The government can play the 
public function of absorbing r isks and 
providing insurance against shocks and 
averse events. 
•  Exit strategies. 
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Within the smallholders’ cooperative or 
other organizations, there should be clear intra-
group membership obligations and rights, and 
accountable leadership procedures.
Further,  i t  is recommended to further 
support regional and national exchange among 
smallholders, and between smallholders, strategic 
partners and agribusiness to compare and learn 
about model contracts and experiences, as in 
the policy dialogue in 2009. Exchange even just 
within the Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme would 
overcome the scheme’s decades-old divisions 
along tribal lines and the post-2000 division of the 
scheme over four municipalities.
Under these conditions, smallholders can 
produce and develop their capacities while 
s t ra teg ic  par tners  can br ing the i r  th ree 
advantages: capital for inputs, technological 
skills, and forward and backward linkages. New 
public loan facilities for smallholders would 
further reduce smallholders’ dependency on the 
agribusiness’ capital. 
In addit ion to enabling and monitoring 
a robust  and t ransparent  shor t  route to 
accountabi l i ty,  the government maintains 
important mandates about land and water, 
both within and outside joint ventures. These 
government mandates are part of the second 
leg of the long route to accountability, in which 
policy makers shape the government’s service 
delivery interventions on the ground. The 
events in the Flag Boshielo irrigation scheme 
and elsewhere suggest the recommendations 
explained below. 
Shaping the Second Leg of the Long 
Route to Accountability 
Land Tenure
The government is the custodian of land in former 
homelands and often the formal owner of irrigated 
land, whether in the sharecropping arrangements 
of joint ventures, out-growers, lease arrangements 
or in smallholder schemes. Smallholders may not 
even be aware of the value of their land and can 
lose out, especially when they are in immediate 
dire need for cash. Improved tenure security, 
which will also increase the land value, can 
considerably strengthen smallholders’ bargaining 
position vis-à-vis outside partners.  
Moreover, land tenure is key for intra-group 
relations. It is often a bone of intra-community 
contention, as in Elandskraal, where it halted 
production, or in Strydkraal, where the traditional 
tribal power over land was strongly contested 
and led to intra-village tensions. In smallholder 
schemes, lease markets already exist widely. 
Formalization of these can further strengthen 
both tenure security and production, also in 
heterogeneous schemes (Manona et al. 2010; 
van Averbeke et al. 2011). For any land tenure, 
including irrigation schemes, the government is 
the duty bearer of women’s constitutional land 
rights. Tenure security for young women and men 
is likely to support their engagement in production 
(Manona et al. 2010). Hence, the government’s 
proactive tenure reform in smallholder irrigation is 
recommended. 
Irrigation Infrastructure
In the joint ventures of the Flag Boshielo irrigation 
scheme, the government took the responsibility 
for installing new irrigation equipment, obtained 
from the irrigation industry. This was the most 
expensive component of the revitalization of 
irrigation schemes, and a main attraction for the 
strategic partner. The continuation of the irrigation 
industry’s preference for large-scale, centrally 
controlled technology warranted the pooling of 
the individual plots of the pre-1994 out-grower 
arrangements into the one, centrally managed 
scheme of the joint venture. The type of irrigation 
infrastructure also appeared to strongly influence 
the performance of smallholders’ irrigation 
elsewhere. A study of South Africa’s 206 irrigation 
schemes (van Averbeke et al. 2011) showed that 
the percentages of functionality were highest 
for gravity-fed canals, which have the lowest 
operation costs and can be most easily controlled 
by many small farmers: 81%. In contrast, only 
70% of pumped surface irrigation schemes, 
65% of overhead irrigation and 56% percent of 
micro-irrigation schemes were still operational. 
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Farmers’ self-financed initiatives are often carried 
out individually or by small groups, e.g., river 
diversions, small pumps, wetland use or rainwater 
harvesting. 
Therefore, it is the government’s function 
and niche to move beyond the current irrigation 
industry’s large-scale technologies. This entails 
the development and provision of a wider range 
of small-scale technologies at better prices, with 
more training, aftercare and repair opportunities 
for both women and men. Rural electrification at 
affordable prices will further boost smallholders’ 
adoption of irrigation infrastructure. Collaboration 
with the water supply utilities can cost-effectively 
augment the volumes of subsidized water supplies 
for homestead-based cultivation. 
For participatory infrastructure rehabilitation or 
new construction in joint ventures and smallholder 
schemes alike, smallholders’ choice should include 
the range of design elements: the siting of the 
technology, own contributions, future arrangements 
for operation and maintenance, responsibilities 
for longer-term replacement of infrastructure, 
and strategies for long-term rehabilitation and 
replacement, or exit. Participatory design is a 
necessary condition to break the build-neglect-
rebuild syndrome of top-down defined and supply-
driven ‘technological fixes’. 
In Sum
This ‘biography of the Flag Boshielo irrigation 
scheme’ highlighted the rise and fall of a range 
of configurations between states (with very 
different goals and constituencies), corporate 
service providers (the largely continuing large-
scale irrigation industry and large-scale farming 
business) and inhabitants of the scheme. 
Much of the once-productive land still remains 
idle. Joint ventures are one of the options; 
the range of options is wider and includes 
land leasing, out-grower arrangements, and 
smallholder-managed production and sale, 
including proactive support for existing – and 
currently atomistic – informal arrangements 
and management. Research to assess, in 
more detail, smallholder irrigators’ preferences, 
and to compare costs and benefits of the 
range of past and potential configurations is 
recommended to further inform policies in 
South Africa and elsewhere. 
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